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I. INTRODUCTION
In an article in a prior volume of the Pacific Law Journal, the
major civil decisions of the California Court of Appeal for the
Sixth Appellate District that were published during that court's first
three years of operation (1985 through 1987) were analyzed.' In
that article, trends which appeared from a review of all of the
court's reported civil decisions during the same time period were
also identified.2 In this Article, the same two tasks will be
performed with respect to the published opinions of the Sixth
District Court of Appeal in civil cases during the years 1988
through 1990.
At the outset, it should be noted that the Sixth District
experienced several changes in personnel over the last three years.
During that time period, four new justices joined the court and one
of the original members of the court retired. The arrival of three
justices on the same day provided overdue relief to the court.
During its first three years, the Sixth District had far too few
justices to cope with an ever-increasing caseload and backlog.3
The California Legislature authorized the appointment of three new
justices to the court, effective January 1, 1988. 4 However,
Governor George Deukmejian did not fill the new posts right away.
September 29, 1988 was a significant day for the Sixth District
Court of Appeal because three new justices appointed by the
Governor took office on that date. The new justices were
Justice Eugene M. Premo, Justice Christopher C. Cottle and Justice
Franklin D. Elia.5 The three new justices supplied the staffing
which the court desperately needed.
1. R. Hanlon, Emerging Trends in California Jurisprudence: The First Three Years of the
Sixth District Court of Appeal, 20 PAC. W. 1067 (1989) (hereinafter Emerging Trends).
2. Id. at 1069-71 & 1124-25.
3. Id. at 1068-69.
4. 1 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 30.
5. K. ARNOLD, CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK 77, 84, 135 (5th ed. 1988 &
1990 supp.).
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Justice Premo was elevated from the Santa Clara County
Superior Court. He had served as a judge on that court since
January 2, 1975.6 He had formerly served as a municipal court
judge in Santa Clara County from September 23, 1969 to
January 2, 1975.' Justice Cottle came to the court of appeal from
the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, where he had been a judge
since August 26, 1977.8 Justice Elia had served on the Santa Clara
County Superior Court since July 7, 1986 and was a Santa Clara
County Municipal Court judge from October 14, 1983 to July 7,
1986. 9
June 30, 1989 was another memorable day in the history of the
court. Justice Harry F. Brauer, one of the original justices
appointed to the court, retired on that day.1" Thus, the court lost
one of its greatest writers and one of its most inquisitive members
at oral argument. Governor Deukmejian appointed Justice Patricia
Bamattre-Manoukian to fill the vacancy left by Justice Brauer's
retirement. Justice Bamattre-Manoukian joined the court of appeal
on October 16, 1989, after serving as a Santa Clara County
Superior Court judge since March 7, 1988.1 She had been a Santa
Clara County Municipal Court judge from July 31, 1985 to
March 7, 1988 and an Orange County Municipal Court judge from
October 31, 1983 to June 2, 1985.12
Over the last three years, the Sixth District maintained its
reputation as one of the hardest working courts of appeal in the
state.1 3 For the year ending July 30, 1988, the Sixth District led
the state in the number of appeals and original proceedings
resolved by an opinion per justice." By a great margin, the Sixth
6. Id at 441 (5th ed. 1988).
7. Id
8. Id at 201.
9. Id at 231.
10. Id at 68 (1990 Supp.).
11. Id at 64.
12. Id at 137 (5th ed. 1988).
13. Data is available only fortwo years: July 1, 1987-June 30,1988 andJuly 1,1988-June 30,
1989. The Judicial Council of California has not yet released its annual report for the July 1, 1989-
June 30, 1990 year.
14. 1JUIcI~lA COUNcil. OF CALiFoRNIA, 1989 ANNUAL REPoRT 31 (Figure 5), 36 (Table T9).
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District likewise led the state in the number of dispositions of
appeals and original proceedings, with or without opinion, per
justice.1 5 The Sixth District held the top rank in productivity
before the three new justices took office; the three sitting justices
undoubtedly were working at a frenetic pace to prevent the backlog
from spiraling. After the three new justices joined the court, they
could not be expected immediately to decide cases at the same rate
as the sitting justices. Nonetheless, the Sixth District performed
very well during the year ending June 30, 1989. Under the standard
of dispositions of appeals and original proceedings by opinion per
justice, the Sixth District was second in the state in 1988-89, just
behind the Third District.16 In 1988-1989, the Sixth District met
the statewide average in dispositions of appeals, with or without
opinion, per justice.17 Data for the year ending June 30, 1990 has
not yet been released.
The Sixth District showed no reluctance at publishing the
court's opinions in civil cases. For example, in the year ending
June 30, 1988, the Sixth District published twenty-two percent of
its majority opinions in civil cases, compared to the statewide
average of eighteen percent.18 In the year ending June 30, 1989,
the Sixth District met the statewide average of sixteen percent of
majority opinions published in civil appeals."' The Sixth District's
productivity and publication rate in future years can only improve,
after the four relatively new justices have acclimated to their
positions.
II. GENERAL TRENDS IN CIVIL CASES
In 1988-1990, the Sixth District issued 155 published opinions
in civil cases, including opinions superseded by the supreme court's
grant of review, but excluding opinions which the supreme court
depublished without review. In this Article, as in Emerging Trends,
15. l. at 31 (Figure 4), 36 (Table T9).
16. 1 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (Figure 3).
17. 1& at 38 (Figure 7).
18. 1 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALvoRmA, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 61 (Table T25).
19. 1 JUDIcIAL CoUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1990 ANNuAL REPORT 48 (Table 8).
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the general trends which emerge from a review of the Sixth
District's 155 published opinions in civil cases will be noted. Also,
the rationale in the court's major civil decisions will be analyzed.
A major trend in the court's 1985-1987 opinions was that the
court exhibited judicial conservatism, but not political
conservatism. Although the court strictly construed the law and
refused to create new law, it often would rule against "big
business. '" 2 0 Other significant trends were: (1) The court strictly
applied statutes of repose in tort cases to cut off the rights of even
severely injured plaintiffs; (2) the court ruled in favor of employers
in every reported employment or labor law case; (3) landlords won
every one of the court's few published landlord-tenant decisions;
(4) the court generally ruled against developers and public agencies
in California Environmental Quality Act21 ("CEQA") cases; and
(5) the court displayed a benign attitude toward consumers in
consumer law cases and likewise decided lender-borrower cases in
favor of the borrower.'
The salient trend in the court's 1988-1990 opinions is that the
Sixth District has grown more conservative. That is the inescapable
conclusion from a comparison of the general trends in the court's
1985-1987 opinions with the general trends in the court's 1988-
1990 decisions.
In tort cases decided in 1988-1990, the Sixth District continued
to reject the claims of plaintiffs in most cases. For example, the
court ruled in favor of the government in all eight tort cases in
which the government was the defendant. However, the results
were far from uniform when the liability of a private party was at
issue: The court decided three cases in favor of the defendant, but
three other important cases in favor of the plaintiff." When it
applied a statute of limitations in a tort case, the court's decisions
again were split evenly again: Two plaintiffs prevailed, but two
other plaintiffs suffered dismissals.24
20. Emerging Trends, supra note 1, at 1070, 1124.
21. CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986 & 1991 Supp.).
22. Emerging Trends, supra note 1, at 1070-71 & 1124-25.
23. See infra notes 311-45 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 146-80 and accompanying text.
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In its insurance law cases, the Sixth District showed a strong
predisposition to rule in favor of insurance companies. In 1988-
1990, insurers were the victors in nine out of eleven insurance
coverage cases. As discussed below, the supreme court granted
review in two of the decisions which favored the insurer, reversing
one and ordering reconsideration in the other. The reasoning in
other pro-insurer decisions seems questionable. The Sixth District
also ruled for the insurer in two out of three non-coverage cases;
the insured prevailed in the third case where the court applied
Nevada law.'
In 1988-1990, the Sixth District again was partial to employers
in employment law cases, although not consistently so, as it was in
its 1985-1987 decisions. In 1988-1990, the court denied recovery
in four out of seven wrongful termination cases involving a private
employer. The court ruled in favor of the government in both of
the two minor cases involving a public employer. In three labor
cases, employers won two and obtained a "split decision" in the
third case.26
Hn its 1988-1990 decisions, the Sixth District signaled a
departure from the proconservation stance which it exhibited in its
1985-1987 opinions. In 1988-1990, the court concluded that the
public agency had complied with CEQA in five out of seven cases.
The court delivered mixed rulings in three non-CEQA cases
involving environmental issues.27
11n 1988-1990, the court's landlord-tenant decisions did not
always favor landlords, as they did in 1985-1987. Instead, tenants
prevailed in two such cases and landlords were victorious in the
other two cases. The court did not publish any lender-borrower
opinions, much less an opinion which favored a borrower. Nor did
the court publish any consumer law cases in 1988-1990.21
In constitutional law cases, the court did not hesitate to
safeguard freedom of the press in libel actions and the right to
25. See infra notes 181-299 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 300-90 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 391-463 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 464-89 and accompanying text.
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privacy in a mandatory drug testing case. However, the court would
not allow the right of religious expression to immunize church
members from the consequences of their injurious conduct2 9
Finally, as in the area of tort law, the court continued to apply
procedural statutes strictly, even to bar a plaintiff's entire action.
In 1988-1990, the Sixth District tossed out a plaintiff's action in
five out of seven cases in which it applied the dismissal rules in
the Code of Civil Procedure.3"
In sum, in its 1988-1990 decisions, the Sixth District: (1)
continued to disfavor tort and wrongful termination plaintiffs; (2)
revealed a marked tendency to rule for insurers in both insurance
coverage and non-coverage cases; (3) shifted away from favoring
environmental concerns in CEQA cases; (4) issued a mixed bag of
decisions in the landlord-tenant realm; and (5) did not publish any
decisions which favored consumers or borrowers. Although the
Sixth District's 1988-1990 decisions did not unanimously favor
employers and landlords, as they did in 1985-1987, the overall
impression which the court conveyed in 1988-1990 is that it moved
in a more conservative direction.
The new justices on the court are not necessarily responsible
for this change in direction. The justices who serve on the Sixth
District Court of Appeal appear to think alike. Out of 155
published civil decisions in 1988-1990, only two dissenting
opinions were written.
Another notable trend is that it was nearly impossible to "fight
city hall" in the Sixth District Court of Appeal in 1988-1990. The
government prevailed in all eight tort actions, in both employment
law cases and in most of the environmental and land use appeals
which the Sixth District decided in 1988-1990.
29. See infra notes 490-549 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 550-96 and accompanying text.
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II. TORT CASES
A. The Sixth District Ruled for the Government in All of Its
Government Tort Liability Cases
1. Breach of Duty Cases Involving Public Defendants
In all eight of the Sixth District's tort decisions involving
public defendants, the court refused to hold the government liable
for damages. In three such cases, the court concluded that the
public defendants owed no legal duty to the plaintiffs.
In Garcia v. Superior Court,3 the court held that the trial
court properly sustained the demurrer of certain state defendants in
an action for wrongful death arising out of the death of the
plaintiffs' mother (Morales).32 One defendant was the parol agent
who was supervising the parol of the individual (Johnson) who
eventually murdered Morales. The parol agent knew that Johnson:
(1) previously had murdered his wife in a fit of jealousy; (2)
previously had an intimate relationship with Morales and that
Morales had terminated that relationship; and (3) had threatened to
look for and kill Morales in a conversation with the parol agent.33
When the parol agent and Morales had a telephone conversation
regarding Morales' safety, the parol agent misinformed Morales
that she had nothing to worry about because Johnson was not going
to come looking for her. Shortly thereafter, Johnson kidnapped and
murdered Morales. The court of appeal concluded that the parol
officer's erroneous advice did not involve a breach of duty.' The
court explained that the murder of Morales was not a foreseeable
result of the parol agent's misinformation, there was not a close
connection between the erroneous advice and the victim's death
31. 215 Cal. App. 3d 695, 249 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1988), affid in part, rev'd in part, 50 Cal. 3d
728, 789 P.2d 960, 268 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1990) (opinion superseded by Supreme Court's grant of
review).
32. Id. at 699, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
33. IL at 700, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
34. Id
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and the burden on the community would be too great, if liability
were fastened on a parol officer under these circumstances.35
In Garcia, the California Supreme Court effectively reversed
the decision of the Sixth District, holding that the plaintiffs could
state a cause of action for "negligent misrepresentation involving
a risk of physical harm."' 36 The supreme court decided that the
parol agent had a duty to use reasonable care in his voluntary
communications with Morales, even though he had no duty to
speak to Morales in the first place.37 The court further found that
the plaintiffs had pleaded adequately the parol officer's negligence
and the proximate cause element, but had failed to allege the
victim's reasonable reliance on the parol agent's
misrepresentations. 3 Accordingly, the supreme court granted the
plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
The supreme court actually agreed with the Sixth District that
the plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action for wrongful death in
Garcia. However, the supreme court, unlike the court of appeal,
determined that the plaintiffs could state a valid claim against the
state defendants. The supreme court correctly and fairly decided the
ultimate issue: upon electing to speak to Morales about her
personal safety, the parol agent had a duty to use reasonable care
and to refrain from making misrepresentations which could lull her
into a false sense of security.
In a similar case, the Sixth District reached the same result as
it did in Garcia. In City of Sunnyvale v. Superior Court,39 police
officers cited two men for unlawful possession of alcohol in a car
and released them. The two men proceeded to continue to drink
and drive until the car crashed and injured the plaintiff, who was
another passenger in the car. The plaintiff sued the city which
employed the police officers, contending that the policemen, at the
time that they stopped the car, had a duty to advise the plaintiff to
35. Id at 702-03, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
36. Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 728, 732, 789 P. 2d 960, 968, 268 Cal. Rptr. 779,
787 (1990).
37. Id at 736, 789 P.2d at 964, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 783-84.
38. Id at 736-37, 789 P.2d at 965, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 783-84.
39. 203 Cal. App. 3d 839, 250 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1988).
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get out of the car and find other transportation. Following
established precedent, the Sixth District held that the police officers
had no duty of care to the plaintiff.' The court reasoned that one
has no duty to protect or assist another, unless the first party has
created a peril or has a special relationship with the other party that
imposes a duty to act.4 ' The court distinguished cases where the
police officers had caused danger to the victim by willingly
undertaking a duty to protect the plaintiff and then negligently
performing that duty.42 In City of Sunnyvale, the Sixth District
properly found that the police officers owed no legal duty to the
plaintiff.
In Gray v. State of California,43 the court again concluded that
the government was not liable in tort on the ground that the
government had no duty of care to the plaintiff. Pursuant to Penal
Code section 12076," the California Department of Justice
investigated a potential handgun purchaser's criminal record in
California, but did not check any out-of-state records on the gun
purchaser.45 The Department found that the purchaser was eligible
for the purchase.46 Six months after he bought the gun, the gun
purchaser shot and killed the plaintiff's decedent.47 The gun
purchaser had been certified as mentally ill and had been
committed to an institution for the mentally ill in South Dakota.48
If the Department had discovered that fact, it would have found
that the gun purchaser was legally ineligible to own a gun.49 In
Justice Elia's first published opinion in a civil case, the Sixth
40. Id at 842, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
41. Id at 843, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17.
42. Id at 844, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18. Mann v. State of California, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773,
139 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1977); McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 252, 449 P.2d 453 (1969)
74 Cal. Rptr. 389; Johnson v. State of California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240
(1968); Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1964).
43. 207 Cal. App. 3d 151, 254 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1989).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12076 (West Supp. 1991).
45. Gray, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 153, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
46. Iad
47. Id at 154, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
48. Id at 153, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
49. Gray, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 153,254 Cal. Rptr. at 582. See also CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE
§§ 8100,8103 (West Supp. 1991) (possession, purchase, or receipt of firearm or other deadly weapon
by mental patient and weapons restrictions for particular persons, respectively).
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District ruled that Penal Code section 12076 did not impose upon
the Justice Department a duty to conduct an investigation in any
particular manner; the statute conferred upon the Department the
discretion to conduct an investigation of a purchaser's eligibility for
handgun ownership, as the Department saw fit.5" Thus, the court
affirmed the summary judgment for the state in the wrongful death
action.5" Notwithstanding the harsh result, the court's decision
seems correct. As the court explained, given that Penal Code
section 12076 does not set forth standards for investigations, the
court effectively would redraft the statute, if it were to impose its
own standards.52
In another tort case, the Sixth District found that a public
agency did have a duty to the plaintiff, but had not breached that
duty. In Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water District,53 the court
held that the water district was neither absolutely immune from
liability nor strictly liable for the damage to the plaintiff's property
that was caused by natural conditions on the water district's
upstream property during a severe rainstorm.5" The court further
decided that a plaintiff must prove negligence in the handling of a
natural condition in order to impose liability on another property
owner, under the theory of nuisance, for property damage caused
by the natural condition.55 The court expressed its disagreement
with a line of older cases which imposed liability for nuisance
without proof of wrongful conduct.5 6 As the jury found that the
water district was not negligent, the court of appeal affirmed the
50. Gray, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 155, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84.
51. Id. at 153 and 158, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 582 and 585.
52. Id. at 158, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
53. 206 Cal. App. 3d 92, 253 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1988).
54. Id. at 101, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
55. IM. at 102, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
56. Id. at 102, n.5, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 474, n.5. Bonde v. Bishop, 112 Cal. App. 2d 1,245 P.2d
617 (1952); Crance v. Hens, 17 Cal. App. 2d 450, 62 P.2d 395 (1936); Parsons v. Luhr, 205 Cal.
193, 270 p. 443 (1928); Shevlin v. Johnston, 56 Cal. App. 563, 205 p. 1087 (1922); Grandona v.
Lovdal, 70 Cal. 161, 11 p. 623 (1886).
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judgment in favor of the water district." The court's rationale
seems correct in view of the California Supreme Court's decision
in Sprecher v. Adamson Companies.58
2. Government Immunity Cases
In three cases, the Sixth District determined that a statutory
immunity barred the imposition of tort liability on the government.
In City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court,59 the court held that
Government Code section 831.2, which shields a public entity from
liability for any injury caused by a natural condition on
unimproved public property, ° precluded the imposition of liability
on a city for the personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff when he
dived into a sandbar in a river.6 In doing so, the Sixth District
distinguished and criticized Gonzales v. City of San Diego.62
Gonzales had created a "hybrid condition" exception to
section 831.2.63 The exception to the statutory immunity applies
if a city is negligent in providing lifeguards or warning signs on
unimproved beaches; the beach is deemed improved if the city fails
to give adequate warnings of unsafe conditions at the beach.( The
Sixth District charged that the "hybrid condition" exception
created by Gonzales is inconsistent with the intent of the
legislature, which sought to restrict governmental liability resulting
from the use of public property, unless the public entity
affirmatively acted to increase the degree of peril of a natural
condition.65
57. ML at 106, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
58. See Sprecherv. Adamson Companies, 30 Cal. 3d 358,371,636 P.2d 1121,1128, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 783, 790 (1981) (holding that liability could result from a failure to exercise due care in
correcting a perilous natural condition on one's land).
59. 198 Cal. App. 3d 999, 244 CaL Rptr. 105 (1988).
60. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.2 (West 1980).
61. City of Santa Cruz, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 100-02, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
62. 130 Cal. App. 3d 882, 182 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1982).
63. Id at 885-86, 183, Cal. Rptr. at 75.
64. Id
65. City of Santa Cruz, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 1006-07, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09.
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The Gonzales exception to section 831.2 lacks vitality. As the
Sixth District noted in City of Santa Cruz, the legislature
effectively has overruled Gonzales by adopting Government Code
section 831.21, which provides that public beaches are deemed to
be in a natural condition, whether or not lifeguards or warning
signs are present.' Therefore, the Sixth District's reading of
legislative intent, in its criticism of Gonzales, was entirely proper.
Also, in a subsequent case with facts virtually identical to the facts
in City of Santa Cruz, the court of appeal criticized Gonzales and
quoted the Santa Cruz opinion with approval.67
The Sixth District applied the bar of a government immunity
statute again in Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon.68 The plaintiffs had
been found guilty of unlawfully underweighing squid which they
had purchased from fishermen. In a California Department of Fish
and Game newsletter, an investigating officer grossly overstated the
magnitude of the fraud committed by the plaintiffs. The Sixth
District concluded that the investigating officer and the Department
were immune from liability for libel under Government Code
section 821.6.69 Adopting the reasoning of the court in Kayfetz v.
State of California,"° the court explained that the publication was
authorized by law and was part of the prosecuting process.71
66. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.21 (West Supp. 1991).
67. Morin v. County of Los Angeles, 215 Cal. App. 3d 184, 191-94,263 Cal. Rptr. 479,483-
85 (1989).
68. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1496, 257 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1989).
69. Id at 1500, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 67. See also CAL. GOv'T CODE § 821.6 (West 1984).
Section 821.6 provides:
A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any
judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts
maliciously and without probable cause.
Rd
70. 156 Cal. App. 3d 491,497-98,203 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36-37 (1984) (holding that section 821.6
exempted the Board of Medical Quality Assurance from liability for publication of the Board's
confidential disciplinary action against a doctor in the Board's newsletter because the publication was
authorized by statute and was deemed to be part of the prosecution of the disciplinary proceeding).
71. Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1499-1500, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
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In LaBadie v. State of California,72 the court held that
Government Code section 865573 precluded liability of the state
for the plaintiff's personal injuries which resulted from the state's
Emergency Medfly Spraying Program.74 The court essentially
followed its earlier decision in Farmers Insurance Exchange v.
State of California.75
3. Government Tort Claims Act Case
In another public defendant tort case, the Sixth District ruled
that the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the procedural
requirements of the Tort Claims Act76 barred them from bringing
a tort action against a public agency. In Santee v. Santa Clara
County Office of Education,7 the court determined that the
plaintiffs neither timely filed a claim, as required by Government
Code section 911.2,78 nor substantially complied with the
requirements of the Government Code section 911.4 for filing
a late-claim application." With regard to the latter issue, the court
stated that the plaintiffs' timely presentation of a late-claim
application to the County Board of Supervisors was ineffective,
where the only public agency which could be liable the County
Office of Education was a separate entity.8"
In Santee, the Sixth District announced its position on an issue
which has divided the courts. Whenever there is any question as to
whether a party has timely filed a tort claim with a public agency,
the party could bring an immediate tort action upon the denial of
the claim and contend that the agency simply denied a timely
72. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1366, 256 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1989).
73. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8655 (West 1984) (liability of state or political subdivisions for
discretionary functions).
74. LaBadie, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1369, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
75. 175 Cal. App. 3d 494, 505, 221 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231-32 (1985).
76. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 900 et seq. (West 1980).
77. 220 Cal. App. 3d 702, 269 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990).
78. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 911.2 (West Supp. 1991) (time of presentation of claims).
79. See id § 911.4 (West Supp. 1991) (application to present late claim).
80. Santee, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 712-14, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 610-12.
81. Id at 713-14, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
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claim. Alternatively, the cautious approach would be for the party
to file a late-claim application with the public agency82 and, after
the application is denied, file in court a petition for relief from the
failure to timely file a claim.83 As the Sixth District pointed out,
some courts hold that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to decide the
issue of the timeliness of the filing of the tort claim in the claim-
relief proceeding because the predicate for such a proceeding is
that the claim was not timely filed.84 Under that view, the party's
timeliness in filing the tort claim should be decided only in the
plaintiff's tort action against the public agency. Other courts hold
that the trial court can decide that issue in the claim-relief
proceeding. 5
In Santee, the Sixth District adopted the latter approach,
concluding that a trial court has jurisdiction to decide the issue of
the timeliness of the filing of the tort claim in the claim-relief
proceeding. 6 That approach seems sensible. If a court must
decide in a claim-relief proceeding whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to relief from default, the court certainly should be able to
decide in that proceeding whether or not the plaintiff is in default.
Moreover, judicial economy would be served by allowing the trial
court to decide all issues concerning the plaintiff's compliance with
Tort Claims Act procedures before the plaintiff commences the tort
action against the public agency.
B. The Sixth District's Decisions Contained Mixed Results for
Private Defendants in Tort Cases
When a private party was the defendant in a tort case, the Sixth
District's decisions were evenly divided. The court ruled in favor
82. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 911.4 (West Supp. 1991).
83. See id § 946.6 (West Supp. 1991).
84. Santee, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 711, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (see Ngo v. County of Los
Angeles, 197 Cal. App. 3d 584, 243 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1988); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,
169 Cal. App. 3d 1095, 215 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1985).
85. Id. (see Reyes v. County of Los Angeles, 197 Cal. App. 3d 584,243 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1988);
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 3d 1095, 215 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1985).
86. Id
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of the defendant in three of those cases and ruled for the plaintiff
in three such cases.
1. The Court Found No Tort Liability in Three Private
Defendant Cases
In three tort cases involving private defendants, the Sixth
District decided that the defendant was exempt from any liability.
In each of those three cases, the court refused to create a statutory
exception that would allow an injured plaintiff to recover
compensation for personal injuries.
In Hepe v. Paknad,87 the plaintiff was injured when he was
struck by a car driven by an individual who had just consumed
alcoholic beverages at a bar owned by a defendant. Seeking to
evade the immunity conferred by Business and Professions Code
section 25602 upon servers of alcoholic beverages for injuries
resulting from a consumer's intoxication, 8 the plaintiff alleged
that the defendants knew or should have known that the driver
suffered from alcoholism and thus, they had a duty to refrain from
serving alcoholic beverages to the driver.8 9 Applying the
California Supreme Court's ruling in Strang v. Cabrol,' the Sixth
District refused to find an exception to the statutory immunity
beyond the statutory exception for service of alcoholic beverages
to an obviously intoxicated minor.9'
In doing so, the Sixth District specifically criticized the decision
in Cantor v. Anderson,' which held that the section 25602
immunity does not apply where the server knows that the consumer
should not be given any alcoholic beverages due to some
exceptional physical or mental condition. Pointing out that the
Cantor decision is inconsistent with the language in section 25602
87. 199 Cal. App. 3d 412, 244 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1988).
88. Id at 414-15, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 824. See CAL. Bus. & PRO. CODE § 25602 (West 1985)
(immunity for servers).
89. Hepe, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 414, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
90. 37 Cal. 3d 720,728,209 Cal. Rptr. 347,691 P.2d 1013 (1984) (holding that no exception
to the section 25602 immunity exists, other than the single exception set forth in the statute).
91. Hepe, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 418-19, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
92. 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1981).
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and the supreme court's subsequent decision in Strang, the Sixth
District in Hepe essentially issued a call to courts to refuse to
follow Cantor's example and to deny any request to create a
nonstatutory exception to section 25602. 93
The court arrived at the same conclusion in Dodge Center v.
Superior Court.94 The plaintiff was injured when he was struck by
a truck driven by an unlicensed driver. Relying upon Vehicle Code
section 14606(a),95 the plaintiff sought to impose liability on the
car dealership which had sold the truck to the driver and which had
not verified whether the purchaser had a driver's license.
Section 14606(a) prohibits a vehicle owner from knowingly
allowing an unlicensed driver to use a motor vehicle.96 If the
prohibition has been violated, the statute imposes liability on the
consenting party for injuries resulting from the other driver's
negligence.97 The Sixth District concluded that section 14606
requires knowledge of the other driver's lack of a license and
creates no duty of inquiry." The court noted that the casting of
a duty of inquiry regarding license verification on a car seller
would be unprecedented.99 Likewise, the court also determined
that the car dealership had no duty to inquire about the truck
purchaser's driving record before selling the vehicle to him." ° As
the plaintiff submitted no evidence indicating that the car
dealership had actual knowledge of the truck driver's lack of a
license or poor driving record, the court of appeal issued a writ of
mandate directing the trial court to issue an order granting the car
dealership's motion for summary judgment.101
In Williams v. Foster,'°2 the Sixth District held that a property
owner's duty under Streets and Highways Code section 5610 to
93. Hepe, 199 Cal. App. 3d 417-18, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 826827.
94. 199 Cal. App. 3d 332, 244 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1988).
95. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 14606(a) (West 1987).
96. CAL. VEI. CODE § 14606(a) (West 1987).
97. Id
98. Dodge Center, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 338, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
99. Id at 342, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
100. Id
101. Id at 338, 343, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 792, 795.
102. 216 Cal. App. 3d 510, 265 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1989).
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maintain and repair public sidewalks adjoining his or her
property 103 is not owed to pedestrians who use the sidewalk."°4
Following Schaefer v. Lenahan, °5 the court declined to find that
the statutory duty to maintain sidewalks ran in favor of any person
who used the sidewalk, in the absence of clear statutory language
which indicated that the duty is owed to the public.'06 Thus, the
Williams plaintiff could not recover damages from the private
defendant for injuries sustained in a trip and fall accident on the
sidewalk abutting the defendant's property. 7 A subsequent case
already has followed the Sixth District's holding in Williams.'"8
2. The Court Found Private Defendants Liable in Three Other
Tort Cases
Although it repeatedly frowns upon tort liability, the Sixth
District's most important tort decisions in 1988-1990 imposed
liability on the defendant. In Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,'09 the
court held that an accounting firm was liable for its negligence in
preparing an audit opinion, which was issued just prior to a public
offering of a corporation's securities, to reasonably foreseeable
plaintiffs - none of whom were clients of the accounting firm -
who relied on the audit opinion in purchasing the securities.10 In
reaching that result, the Sixth District expressly relied upon the
holding and reasoning in the Fourth District's opinion in
International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Corp." Although its opinion has been superseded by the
103. CAL STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5610 (West 1969).
104. Williams, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 522, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
105. 63 Cal. App. 2d 324, 146 P.2d 929 (1944).
106. Williams, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 521, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
107. i d at 522, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
108. See Selger v. Steven Bros., Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1585, 1590, 272 Cal. Rptr. 544, 548
(1990).
109. 222 Cal. App. 3d 289, 271 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1990), review granted and opinion superseded,
798 P.2d 1214, 274 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1990).
110. Id at 295-96, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
111. 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986).
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supreme court's grant of review in Bily, the Sixth District's
rationale can be gleaned through a review of International
Mortgage.
The issue of an accountant's liability for professional
negligence to non-client third parties has stirred considerable
controversy in state appellate courts. A leading early case on the
issue was an opinion authored by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche. 2 In Ultramares, the New York Court of
Appeals held that an accounting firm was not liable for the
negligent preparation of financial statements to a plaintiff who had
no contractual privity with the firm." 3 The soundness of the
Ultramares holding has been the subject of a raging debate in state
courts throughout the land, with many courts taking each side of
the debate." 4 In its recent opinion in Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Arthur Anderson & Co."5 the New York Court of Appeals
retreated from the privity requirement in Ultramares. The court
concluded that an accounting firm could be liable for negligence to
a non-contracting party only if three factors were present: (1) the
accountant was aware that the financial reports would be used for
a specific purpose; (2) the accountant knew the parties who
intended to rely on the reports; and (3) the accountant's conduct
linked him or her to those parties, thereby demonstrating the
accountant's awareness of the reliance of those parties on the
reports. 1
1 6
In International Mortgage and Bily, the California courts
rejected the Ultramares and Credit Alliance tests, concluding that
an accountant's liability for negligence extends to those
noncontractual parties who reasonably and foreseeably relied upon
the audit reports.11 7 In International Mortgage, the court
112. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
113. It at 189, 174 N.F at 448.
114. See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 65 N.Y. 2d 536, 546, 493
N.Y.S.2d 435, 439, n.7, 483 N.E. 2d 110, 114, n.7 (1985), and cases cited therein.
115. 65 N.Y.2d 536, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 483 N.E.2d 110 (1985).
116. Id at 551,493 N.Y.S.2d at 443, 483 N.E.2d at 118.
117. International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 818-20, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 22627; Bily, 222
Cal. App. 3d at 304-06 and 311, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
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explained that it simply was extending the foreseeability test, which
applied in negligence actions against virtually all other
professionals, to the accounting profession."n
The California Supreme Court's grant of review in Bily
suggests that the plaintiffs are in trouble in that case. Otherwise,
the supreme court would have let the International Mortgage and
Bily decisions stand. In deciding Bily, the supreme court should
consider that even the New York Court of Appeals has discarded
the strict privity test in Ultramares. Also, the major difference
between the Credit Alliance three-part test and the foreseeability
standard is that, under the former test, the accountant must know
and have some interaction with the parties who intended to rely
upon the audit report. Those requirements serve no purpose,
however, if the pertinent public policy is to increase the flow of
accurate information in a securities transaction involving a public
company, such as the transaction in Bily. Measured against that
public policy, the accountant's knowledge of and dealings with the
intended beneficiaries of his or her report are immaterial. n 9 It
seems that foreseeability should be the test for the liability of
accountants to third parties, just as it is the test for all other
professionals in California. In any event, the supreme court's recent
rejection of foreseeability as the touchstone for liability for
negligent infliction of emotional distress 2' foreshadows the
ultimate result in Bily.
The Sixth District issued another significant tort opinion in
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.' The tire company
unlawfully dumped carcinogenic chemicals at a waste disposal site
and thereby contaminated the water supply of the nearby
plaintiffs.1" After their discovery of the water contamination in
118. International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 818-19, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226, and cases cited
therein.
119. See Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO IL REV. 233, 252 (1983).
120. See Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644,663-64,771 P.2d 814,826-27,257 Cal. Rptr. 865,
877-78 (1989).
121. 225 Cal. App. 3d 213, 274 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1990), review granted and opinion superseded,
806 P.2d 308, 278 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1991).
122. Id. at 219, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
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their homes, the plaintiffs eventually became extremely fearful that
they would develop cancer, although none were diagnosed as
having cancer."z The trial court awarded damages, inter alia, in
the amount of $200,000 to each of the four plaintiffs for his or her
"fear of cancer" and a total of $142,975 for the cost to monitor
the plaintiffs' health in the future."2
In Potter, the court of appeal held that a plaintiff can recover
damages for fear of cancer, under a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, where the defendant's negligent
conduct causes the plaintiff to ingest a carcinogenic substance and
to acquire a fear that he or she will get cancer.Y25 The court
further ruled that a plaintiff does not need to prove that he or she
is likely to develop cancer in order to recover for an existing fear
of cancer. 126 The court fashioned a five-part test in order to allow
courts, in future cases, to eliminate false claims of fear of cancer:
(1) the plaintiff must prove the defendant's negligence; (2) the
plaintiff must show that the emotional distress is serious; (3) the
plaintiff must establish that a reasonable person would have
suffered serious emotional distress under the circumstances; (4) the
trier of fact should consider evidence concerning the probability
that the plaintiff will develop cancer, although such evidence is not
dispositive; and (5) the trier of fact should consider expert
testimony, his or her own experience and the specific circumstances
of the case.127
In Potter, the Sixth District reversed the trial court's award of
future medical monitoring costs.12' As the court of appeal pointed
out, there is a split of authority regarding the circumstances under
which a plaintiff may recover the expenses of future medical
surveillance. Most courts conclude that such expenses are
recoverable only where the plaintiff has sustained a physical injury
123. Id. at 220, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
124. Id. at 221, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
125. Id at 225, 229, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 891, 894.
126. let at 225-26, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
127. Id at 226-27, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 892-93.
128. Id at 234, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98.
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or can prove that the latent disease likely will occur.'29 Other
courts hold that evidence of physical harm is not required and that
such costs are recoverable, if expert testimony indicates that the
plaintiff's risk of acquisition of the latent disease has significantly
increased and that the future medical expenses will be reasonable
and necessary."'0 The Sixth District adopted the majority view,
deciding that the minority view effectively creates a new cause of
action, a judicial act which the California Supreme Court alone
should perform."' Applying the majority rule, the court
determined that the plaintiffs were ineligible for future medical
surveillance costs. The evidence showed that the plaintiffs had an
increased risk of cancer, but there was no determination that any
plaintiff likely would get cancer. Nor had any plaintiff suffered any
physical injury.3 2
Whether to deny recovery for fear of cancer or to establish the
right to recover future medical monitoring costs, the supreme court
granted review in Potter. The Sixth District's rationale and test for
the fear of cancer claim seen well-reasoned. However, the position
which the Sixth District chose in the debate over the recoverability
of future medical expenses seems analytically suspect. Under Civil
Code section 3333, the measure of damages in a tort action is the
amount which will compensate the plaintiff for all detriment which
the defendant's wrongful conduct proximately caused.'33 If a
defendant causes a plaintiff to ingest sufficient quantities of a
carcinogenic substance so as to significantly increase the plaintiff's
risk of cancer, the plaintiff necessarily will incur future medical
expenses to monitor his or her health. Such medical expenses
129. Id. at 232,274 Cal. Rptr. at 896. Hagerby v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315,
319 (5th Cir. 1986); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert.
denied 474 U.S. 864-65; DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 744 P.2d 705, 707 (1987);
Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 I11. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E. 2d 1369 (1979).
130. Id In re Paoli, 916 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1990); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F.
Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Burns v. Jaquays Min. Corp., 156 Ariz. 375,752 P.2d 28 (1988); Ayers
v. Jackson 78, 106 NJ. 557,525 A.2d 287,308-10 (1987); Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 102
A.D.2d 130, 477 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1984).
131. Id.
132. Id at 233-34, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
133. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333 (West 1970).
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would be a detriment caused by the defendant's misconduct, within
the meaning of section 3333. If the plaintiff presents expert
testimony which establishes the need for and the amount of future
monitoring costs, then the plaintiff would surmount the obstacle
caused by Civil Code section 3301, which prohibits an award of
speculative or uncertain damages."' Indeed, Civil Code section
3283, which the court cited in Potter,1 35 expressly authorizes an
award of damages which are certain to occur in the future. 136 The
minority view seems the better rule. The supreme court should
allow plaintiffs such as those in Potter to recover future medical
diagnosis expenses, if the plaintiff can prove, with expert
testimony, the need for and amount of such expenses.
In Blankenheim v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,1 37 the Sixth District
addressed the issue of whether Civil Code section 1668 voids a
hold-harmless agreement, insofar as the agreement exempts a party
from liability for negligent misrepresentations. The plaintiffs sued
to recover their lost investments from the stock brokerage firmn
which had sold them the securities which they had bought.1 38 The
defendant argued that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by an
agreement whereby the plaintiffs held the defendant harmless from
any loss resulting from the plaintiffs' investments. 39 Section
1668 operates to void any agreement to exempt any party from
liability for fraud, any other intentional wrong, or a negligent
violation of a statute."4 However, section 1668 does not apply to
a contract which waives a party's liability for ordinary negligence,
if no public policy is at issue. 4' In Blankenheim, the plaintiffs'
cause of action against the stock brokerage firm was for negligent
misrepresentation. Thus, the court had to decide whether the cause
of action for negligent misrepresentation was a claim of intentional
fraud, which could not be waived under section 1668, or a claim
134. Id § 3301 (West 1970).
135. Potter, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 234, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3283 (West 1970).
137. 217 Cal. App. 3d, 1463, 266 Cal. Rpti. 593 (1990).
138. Id at 1466, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
139. Id at 1469, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
140. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1985).
141. Blankenheim, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1471-72, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
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of ordinary negligence, which could be waived under the hold-
harmless agreement.
After noting a conflict in authorities on this issue,' 42 the court
of appeal held in Blankenheim that section 1668 nullified any
agreement to exempt a party from liability for negligent
misrepresentation. 43 The court explained that a cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation is considered a fraud claim, and
section 1668 expressly applies to contracts which seek to exact the
waiver of a claim for fraud.'" The court's position in the
controversy over the applicability of section 1668 seems correct,
because a claim of negligent misrepresentation involves more than
mere negligence; it is a claim of fraud.145
C. The Sixth District's Application of Statutes of Limitations in
Tort Cases Also Achieved Mixed Results
In 1985-1987, the Sixth District regularly applied statutes of
repose to bar the claims of plaintiffs. 46 In 1988-1990, the court
did not always rule for defendants in interpreting and applying
statutes of limitations. Instead, the court decided two of those cases
in favor of the plaintiff and two in favor of the defendant.
1. The Court Enforced a Statute of Limitations to Bar a Claim
in Two Cases
In Sandy v. Superior Court,47 a developer was timely sued
for negligently performing renovations at an apartment complex.
The developer cross-complained for indemnity against an architect
who had performed work on the original construction of the
building more than ten years before the lawsuit against the
developer was filed. The Sixth District held that Code of Civil
142. Id at 1472 n.5, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 598 n.5.
143. Id at 1473, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
144. Id at 1472-73, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 598-99.
145. See, e.g., CAL. CIr. CODE § 1572 (West 1982).
146. Emerging Trends, supra note 1, at 1071-77.
147. 201 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 247 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1988).
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Procedure section 337.15 -- the ten-year statute of limitations for
latent construction defects 14  -- barred the cross-complaint for
indemnity. 149 The court distinguished the California Supreme
Court's decision in Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated,
Inc.,"' which held that a general contractor, who had been timely
sued for construction defects, could file a cross-complaint for
indemnity against a subcontractor who otherwise was exempt from
liability to the plaintiff under section 337.15, by virtue of the
passing of ten years from the date on which the subcontractor's
work was completed."" In Valley Circle, according to the Sixth
District, the general contractor and the subcontractor both
participated in the original construction of the building, whereas the
contractor in Sandy performed his renovations on the building eight
to ten years after the architect had completed his services on the
original construction. After pointing to this distinction, the court of
appeal emphasized that section 337.15(c) allows only a
transactionally related cross-complaint for indemnity after the ten-
year limitations period has expired as to the cross-defendant.
152
In Sandy, the court reasoned that all parties involved in the
original construction should have been able to rely on the fact that
none of them had been sued more than ten years after the project
was completed.'53 Also, a subsequent improver, who is sued for
construction defects, should not be allowed to drag into the case all
parties who performed work on the original construction more than
ten years before the entire lawsuit began.154 Otherwise, section
337.15 would become a nullity and those involved in the
construction industry would face endless liability. 5 5 The court of
appeal arrived at its conclusion in the face of the cross-
complainant's argument that the cross-complaint for indemnity
148. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982).
149. Sandy, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 1280, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 678-79.
150. 33 Cal. 3d 604, 659 P.2d 1160, 189 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1983).
151. l at 606, 659 P.2d at 1161, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
152. Sandy, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 1283-84, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
153. Id at 1285, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
154. Id
155. Id at 1285, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
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could not possibly be time-barred because it had not yet accrued;
the cross-complainant had not yet sustained a loss by the payment
of damages. Deciding a question of first impression, the court
stated that its interpretation and application of section 337.15 was
essential in order to effectuate the legislative intent underlying the
statute, notwithstanding the apparent lack of accrual of the
indemnity claim.1"6
In Gallo v. Superior Court,157 the Sixth District held that the
legislature's passage of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.3
which extended the time for filing a personal injury action by the
victim of a felony against the perpetrator of the crime to one year
after the latter's convictionS8 did not revive the plaintiff's already
time-barred claims for personal injuries, such as causes of action
for assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and negligence, among others. 159 The court
explained that a statute of limitations does not apply retroactively,
unless the legislature expressly provides that it does.'14
In Gallo, the court criticized the court of appeal decision in
Nelson v. Flintkote Co.16 ' Nelson decided that the legislature's
adoption of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2 which extended
the time for filing a cause of action for personal injuries resulting
from exposure to asbestos 62 resurrected claims which were stale
under the previously applicable statute of limitations. 163 The
Nelson court reasoned that unlawful retroactivity was not actually
at issue because the new statute of limitations did not extend the
limitations period, but rather postponed the accrual date for the
affected cause of action." In Gallo, the Sixth District scoffed at
that rationale, commenting that it involved semantics instead of reason.
156. Id at 1286, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
157. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1375, 246 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1988).
158. CAL. CIV. PRoC. CODE § 340.3 (West Supp. 1991).
159. Gallo, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1377, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
160. Id. at 1378, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
161. 172 Cal. App. 3d 727, 218 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1985).
162. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.2 (West 1982).
163. Nelson, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 732-33, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 564-65.
164. Id
165. Gallo, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1380, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90.
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In Gallo, the Sixth District did not address a second rationale
for the decision in Nelson. In Nelson, the court noted that the law
disfavors the retroactive application of a new statute when
substantive rights are affected. However, a statute of limitations for
a common law tort is a procedural rule. Thus, the retroactive
application of a new statute of limitations to revive a time-barred
common law tort claim is permissible because no substantive rights
under a statute are implicated." In Gallo, the plaintiff brought
only common law causes of action. Under the Nelson rationale
(which the Sixth District did not address) the new statute of
limitations would have been applied retroactively to revive the
plaintiff's time-barred common law claims. Had it considered the
point, however, the Gallo court likely would have rejected the
second rationale in Nelson. Consistent with its ruling in Sandy, the
Sixth District probably would have concluded that the defendant
had a right to rely on the expiration of the then-applicable
limitations period.
2. The Court Applied Statutes of Limitations in Favor of the
Plaintiff in Two Other Cases
In Delgado v. Estate of Espinoza,167 the Sixth District applied
the longer of two potentially relevant statutes of limitations, thereby
reversing a judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff had
sustained personal injuries in a car accident while riding in a car
driven by the decedent. 68 The decedent immediately died in the
accident. More than one year after the accident occurred, the
plaintiff sued the estate of the decedent for personal injuries. 69
She also timely filed a claim with the administrator of the
decedent's estate. The administration denied the claims. Thereafter,
she sought to amend her complaint to include an action on a
166. Nelson, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 733,218 Cal. Rptr. at 565. See also 3 WrrXIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, ACTIONS, § 308 at 337-38 (3d ed, 1985) (stating that statutes of limitations are
procedural).
167. 205 Cal. App. 3d 261, 252 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1988).
168. Id at 263, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
169. Id
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rejected claim. 7' The trial court denied her motion to amend and
eventually granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to bring her action within
the one-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure
section 340(3).171
In Delgado, the court of appeal stated that the trial court
applied the wrong statute of limitations. The pertinent statute was
Code of Civil Procedure section 353, which applies in a case where
the defendant has died before the expiration of the otherwise
pertinent statute of limitations.172 Section 353 allows the filing of
an action against the administrator of an estate as late as one year
after the appointment of the administrator. Under section 353, the
plaintiff's action was timely filed. 7 '
In Goebel v. Lauderdale,74 the court again reversed a trial
court's misapplication of a statute of limitations. The plaintiff, a
general contractor, followed the advice of his attorney by collecting
$15,000 owed to him from an unfinished project, and then stopping
work on the project. Unknown to the attorney, he had advised his
client to commit a felony under Penal Code section 44(b), which
prohibits the diversion of funds received on a construction project
for a use other than to finish a project which has not been
completed.'75 The plaintiff was convicted of diversion of
funds. 7 ' He filed his action for legal malpractice within one year
of his conviction, but more than one year after (1) he had received
the advice from his attorney and (2) he had been arrested.' 77 The
trial court granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit under Code
of Civil Procedure section 340.6, the one-year statute of limitations
170. Id. at 264, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
171. Id. at 264,252 Cal. Rptr. at 188. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West Supp. 1991)
(one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions).
172. Delgado, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 264-65, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 187-88. See CAL. Cv. Paoc.
CODE § 353 (West Supp. 1991) (applicable statute in Delgado).
173. Delgado, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 265, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
174. 214 Cal. App. 3d 1502, 263 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1989).
175. Id. at 1505, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 276. See CAL- PENAL CODE § 484(b) (West 1988)
(prohibition of diversion of construction funds).
176. Goebe 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1505, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
177. Id at 1506, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
1086
1991 / Court Of Appeal For The Sixth Appellate District
for legal malpractice actions.178 The court of appeal correctly
concluded that the plaintiffs cause of action for legal malpractice
did not accrue until the plaintiff had suffered actual harm, which
did not occur until the plaintiff was convicted of a crime after
following his attorney's advice.179 Consequently, the court found
that the plaintiff had filed his action within one year of the accrual
of his action."'0
IV. INSURANCE LAW CASES
A. The Sixth District Generally Found No Coverage or Minimal
Coverage Under an Insurance Policy
1. The Court Denied Coverage in all Three Cases Involving
the Application of a Contractual Limitations Provision
In its decisions on insurance coverage, the Sixth District
repeatedly ruled in favor of insurance companies. For example, the
court had three occasions to apply a limitations provision set forth
in an insurance policy. In all three cases, the court ruled that the
insured had not timely commenced his or her action against the
insurer.
In Jekot v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co,"'1 the
homeowner's insurance policy at issue contained the standard one-
year limitations period for an action on the policy. The plaintiff
noticed cracks in the walls and ceiling of her home in September
1982, noticed more cracks in the summer of 1983, received a letter
from a soils engineer in the fall of 1983 indicating that the house
had a foundation settlement problem and was told again by three
contractors in 1984 that the house had a foundation problem. 2
178. Goebel 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1506, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 276. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 340.6 (West Supp. 1991) (statute of limitations).
179. Goebel, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1507, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
180. 1id at 1508, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
181. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1492, 272 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1990), review granted and opinion
superseded, 798 P.2d 1214, 274 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1990).
182. Id at 1496, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
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In July 1985, she learned that the cause of the foundation problem
was negligent construction on the fill and that the house would
require major repair work.183 She filed a claim with her insurer
by September 1985, the claim was denied in February 1986 and
she filed her action against the insurer in April 1986.184 The
plaintiff contended that the limitations provision did not begin to
run until July 1985, when she became aware of the cause of the
property damage, in addition to the damage itself. 5 The court of
appeal refused her request to apply a delayed discovery rule,
holding that she was obligated to file her action within one year of
the date on which the property damage was visible.1 16 Finding
that the limitations period began to run in 1983, when the plaintiff
noticed that the cracks had become worse, the court ruled that the
action was untimely.8 7
The California Supreme Court granted review in Jekot.88
Thereafter, the supreme court remanded Jekot to the Sixth
District189 with instructions to reconsider its decision in view of
the supreme court's recent decision in Prudential-LMI Commercial
Insurance v. Superior Court."9 In Prudential-LMI, the supreme
court adopted the following delayed discovery rule in connection
with a limitations provision in a homeowner's insurance policy like
the one in Jekot:
The insured's suit on the policy will be deemed timely if it
is filed within one year after "inception of the loss,"
defined as that point in time when appreciable damage
occurs and is or should be known to the insured, such that
a reasonable insured would be aware that his notification
duty under the policy has been triggered.19
183. Id. at 1496, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
184. Ia at 1495, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
185. Ia at 1497, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
186. Id at 1504, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
187. L
188. 798 P.2d 1214, 274 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1990)
189. 804 P.2d 1299, 278 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1991).
190. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 798 P.2d 1230, 274 Cal. Rplr. 387 (1990).
191. Il at 686-87, 798 P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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Significantly, discovery of the property damage is the hallmark of
the Prudential-LMI rule. In Jekot, the plaintiff urged the courts to
adopt a delayed discovery rule which would keep the running of
the limitations period in abeyance until the insured discovers the
cause of the property damage.
If the supreme court believed that the factual situation in Jekot
clearly fell outside the Prudential-LMI rule, it simply could have
dismissed review in Jekot. Given the remand, the court apparently
seeks from the Sixth District an opinion as to whether the
Prudential-LMI rule should extend to the delayed discovery of the
cause of property damage. There are good reasons to extend the
law in that direction. Insurance coverage for property damage often
depends upon the cause of the damage; policy exclusions may
preclude coverage for damages resulting from certain events, such
as floods or earthquakes. If a "loss" accrues in the same manner
as a cause of action, a loss should not be deemed to accrue until
the insured is aware of all necessary "elements" of the loss,
including causation. Accordingly, the Prudential-LMI rule could be
adapted in Jekot to say that property damage is not sufficiently
known to trigger an insured's duty to present a claim until the
insured has ascertained the cause of the damage and thus has
acquired sufficient information to determine whether the damage
is covered. At the same time, it also seems reasonable to require
the presentation of a claim upon the discovery of the damage, even
if the cause of the damage is unknown. Upon receiving a claim, an
insurer must conduct, at its expense, an investigation to determine
whether coverage exists. Thus, the insurer must discover the cause
of the damage. It does not seem excessively burdensome to place
on the insured a duty to file a claim upon the discovery of the
damage when the insured can require the insurer to proceed to
discover the cause of the damage.
In Magnolia Square Homeowners Association v. Safeco
Insurance Co.,1  the Sixth District again held that a plaintiff's
action for insurance coverage was barred by the one-year
192. 221 Cal. App. 3d 1049, 271 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990).
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limitations provision in the insurance policy.'93 Magnolia Square
was an easy case because the plaintiff plead itself out of court. In
July 1985, the plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint in a
separate action for construction defects against certain individuals
involved in the construction of the condominium complex at
issue. 94 In that pleading, the plaintiff alleged that it was aware
of numerous structural defects in the building.195 In May 1986,
the plaintiffs experts cut into the building walls at the complex
and discovered the full extent of the structural inadequacies. The
plaintiff presented a claim to its insurer in August 1986.'" In
February 1987, the insurer brought an action for declaratory relief
regarding the insurance policy and the plaintiff filed a cross-
complaint in April 1987.197
On these facts, the court of appeal determined that the
plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in the construction defects
action revealed that the plaintiff had actual notice of extensive
property damage by July 1985.9 The plaintiff contended that it
did not have notice of the property damage until its experts cut into
the walls, but the court dismissed that argument. The court
explained that the plaintiff, at a minimum, had a duty of inquiry
based upon its awareness of the extent of the property damage in
July 1985. 9' Thus, the plaintiff reasonably should have
discovered the full extent of the property damage by July 19 8 5 .200
Finally, following established precedent, the court ruled that the
plaintiff's claims for bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty were
barred because they were essentially claims on the policy and the
plaintiff had failed to commence its action against the insurer
within the one-year limitations provision in the policy.20 1
193. IM. at 1060, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7.
194. Id at 1054, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
195. Id
196. Id at 1055, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
197. Id at 1055, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
198. Id at 1058-59, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 5-6.
199. Id at 1058, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
200. Id at 1059-60, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
201. Id at 1063, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
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In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court,202 the
Sixth District overturned a trial court's interpretation of a
limitations provision in an insurance policy. The limitations
provision was not restricted to actions on the policy. Instead, it
facially applied to all actions which the insured could bring.
Finding that the limitations provision violated Insurance Code
section 207 1,203 the trial court held that the limitations provision
was void.204 The court of appeal upheld the validity of the
provision, construing it to apply only to actions on the policy.
25
The court observed that the trial court should have interpreted the
limitations provision so as to bring it in line with the applicable
statute, rather than nullify the provision.' Thus, the court issued
a writ of mandate directing the trial court to grant the insurer's
summary judgment motion, which had been made on the ground
that the insured had not timely filed its action against the
insurer.20 7
2. The Court Generally Found No Coverage or Minimal
Coverage in its Other Insurance Coverage Cases
In eight published decisions, the Sixth District had occasion to
decide a "pure" insurance coverage issue (i.e., a coverage question
not involving a dispositive procedural matter, such as the
applicability of a limitations provision). The court denied coverage
in four cases, found minimal coverage in two cases and decided
that coverage may exist in the other two cases.
In AIU Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,"' the Sixth District
held that insurance coverage did not extend to
government-compelled response costs to remedy toxic pollution,
imposed pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response
202. 210 Cal. App. 3d 604, 258 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1989).
203. See CAL. INs. CODE § 2071 (West 1972) (standard firm policy).
204. State Farm, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 607, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
205. Id. at 610, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
206. lId
207. Id at 613, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
208. 213 Cal. App. 3d 1219,262 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1989), rev'd, 51 Cal. 3d 807,799 P.2d 1253,
274 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1990) (superseded by supreme court's grant of review).
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Compensation Liability Act (CERCLA).210  The coverage
provisions at issue essentially provided that the insurer would pay
the insured all sums which the insured became legally obligated to
pay as damages because of property damage. The court of appeal
determined that the parties could not reasonably have anticipated
that this coverage provision would apply to remedial costs which
were mandated by the government's exercise of its police power
under CERCLA. 21n
In AIU, the Sixth District vigorously disagreed with Aerojet-
212General Corp. v. Superior Court, which reached the opposite
result on very similar facts on the central issue of whether
CERCLA response costs constitute "damages" under the policies.
The court had three specific criticisms of Aerojet: (1) whereas
Aerojet ruled that all government-compelled response costs were
covered, the Sixth District believed that coverage applied in cases
of harm to the government's proprietary interest in property, but
not in cases where the government merely exercised the police
power; (2) whereas Aerojet concluded that CERCLA response costs
could be damages, even though the costs always are ordered by a
court exercising equitable powers, the Sixth District took issue with
Aerojet's explanation that the distinction between law and equity
no longer exists; and (3) whereas Aerojet determined that CERCLA
response costs are damages, rather than "restitution," the Sixth
District expressly rejected the Aerojet rationale that such costs do
not require the return of wrongfully received property.2"3
In AIU, the California Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Sixth District Court of Appeal.2"4 The court expressly relied
upon the standard rules for interpreting insurance policies: terms
are construed in their ordinary and popular sense, ambiguities are
resolved in favor of coverage and coverage provisions are
209. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 et seq. (1987).
210. AIU, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1234, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
211. Id at 1234-35, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
212. 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 258 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1989).
213. AIU, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1232-34, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
214. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 814,799 P.2d 1253, 1280,274 Cal. Rptr.
820, 347 (1990).
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interpreted broadly so as to protect the reasonable expectations of
the insured. 215
Applying (those rules to the coverage provision at issue, the
court first determined that the insured became "legally obligated"
to pay the CERCLA costs. In doing so, the court, following
Aerojet, rejected the insurer's contention that no "legal" obligation
to pay the costs arises because a court, sitting in "equity," orders
the payment of the costs.216  Relying upon California's
abandonment of the distinction between law and equity, the court
concluded that the reasonable expectations of the insured is that a
legal obligation to pay CERCLA costs results from any order to
pay costs by a court of law.217
Next, the supreme court decided that CERCLA response costs
* 211are "damages" within the meaning of the coverage provision.
The court's holding applied both to court-ordered reimbursement
of cleanup costs, which actually were incurred by the government,
and costs paid pursuant to an injunction compelling the insured to
perform a cleanup on contaminated property, in lieu of a
government cleanup.21 9 Here, the supreme court questioned
Aerojet's interpretation that "damages" should include all sums
paid by the insured for property damage which he or she has
caused.22 The court found that definition too broad and
inconsistent with the ordinary and popular sense of the term
"damages. -" 22' However, the court also stated that, even if the
reimbursement of the government's cleanup expenses constitutes
"restitution," such CERCLA costs are nonetheless "damages" in
the ordinary sense of that term.222
Finally, the supreme court determined that the CERCLA costs
were paid as a result of "property damage" because toxic
contamination of the environment necessarily involved damage to
215. Id at 822, 799 P.2d at 1264, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
216. Id at 824-25, 799 P.2d at 1266, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
217. Id
218. Id at 837, 799 P.2d. at 841-42, Cal.'Rptr. at 844.
219. Id
220. Id at 827-28,799 P.2d at 1267-68, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
221. Id
222. Id at 835-36, 799 P.2d at 1279, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
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property. In this regard, the supreme court expressly rejected the
Sixth District's conclusion that coverage exists to remedy the
government's proprietary interests, but not to comply with the
government's regulatory requirements. In either case, remedial
costs are paid by the insured because of "property damage." 223
The supreme court decided that the insurance policies provided
coverage for CERCLA response costs, whether the cleanup
occurred at the insured's property, on government property, or on
private property owned by a third party. 4
In sum, the supreme court, in AIU, rejected the Sixth District's
analysis and essentially followed Aerojet.
In Fire Insurance Exchange v. Abbott, the Sixth District
decided the issue of the existence of insurance coverage for an
insured's liability for sexual molestation of a child. In two
consolidated cases, the insureds had sexually assaulted children and
plead, in the underlying criminal cases, no contest in one case and
guilty in the other case to felony charges. When the victims sued
the insureds, they each claimed insurance coverage under a
homeowner's policy.226 The policies incorporated Insurance Code
section 533, which provides that an insurer does not have to pay
for a loss resulting from the insured's "willful" act.227 The
insurers requested declaratory relief on the issue of coverage.228
In Abbott, the Sixth District denied coverage, holding that the
insureds' intent to injure must be inferred, as a matter of law, from
their felonious sexual assaults on the children. 9 In reaching that
result, the court dismissed the testimony of the insureds' expert
psychiatrists, who stated that the insureds did not intend to harm
their victims. The court found that the expert testimony was
irrelevant because it related only to the insureds' subjective intent
223. Id at 842-43, 799 P.2d at 1279, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
224. Id at 843, 799 P.2d at 1279, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
225. 204 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1988).
226. Id at 1015, 1017-18, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 621, 623.
227. Id at 1015, 1018, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 621, 623. See CAL. INs. CODE § 533 (West 1972)
(coverage does not exist for willful acts).
228. Abbott, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
229. Abbott, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1023-24, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
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to injure their victims; the psychiatric evidence did not tend to
prove whether the insureds intended to perform the acts which
constituted criminal child molestation." ° It was the mere
performance of those acts which established the inference that the
insureds did intend to harm their victims. 1 3
On the question of the insureds' "subjective intent," the court's
opinion in Abbott contained an inconsistency. The court first stated:
We assume that the policies' definition of accident as "a
sudden event.., resulting in bodily injury... neither
expected or intended by the insured" excludes from
insurance coverage only conduct by the insured which was
subjectively intended to harm or injure.232
In rejecting the insured's psychiatric evidence as irrelevant, the
court later commented that the evidence was irrelevant because it
related only to the insured's subjective intent to harm their
victims.1 3 The court's reason for rejecting the psychiatric
evidence was at odds with its earlier assumption.
In a recent decision, the supreme court eliminated any
ambiguity resulting from the Sixth District's opinion in Abbott. In
J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co. v. M.K, 234 which presented
facts virtually identical to the facts in Abbott, the supreme court
held that Insurance Code section 533 precluded coverage for an
insured's liability for damages resulting from the sexual
molestation of a child.'-' The supreme court explained:
Because the wrongful act of child molestation is itself the
harm, section 533 does not require a showing of the
insured's subjective intent to harm ... . Section 533
precludes coverage in this case because child molestation is
230. Id at 1028-29, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31.
231. Id
232. Id. at 1021, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
233. Id. at 1029, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
234. 52 Cal. 3d 1009, 804 P.2d 689, 278 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1991).
235. Id at 1021, 804 P.2d at 695, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
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always intentional, it is always wrongful, and it is always
harmful. 6
The court scorned the insured's expert psychiatric testimony, which
suggested that the insured's sexual assault of a child in that case
was intended as affection rather than harm. Relying upon Abbott,
the supreme court emphasized that such testimony was irrelevant
because the subjective intent of a child molester is immaterial to
the issue of insurance coverage.237 In view of the supreme court's
decision in J.C. Penney, the assumption expressed by the Sixth
District in Abbott should be ignored.
In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Berry,238 the Sixth
District ruled that the insured's disability from and medical
treatment for his manic-depressive illness were not covered by his
disability and medical insurance policies, except for medical
benefits of $500 per year.239 The disability policy at issue
contained an exclusion for mental or nervous disorders. The
medical plan contained a benefits limitation for "mental and/or
nervous treatment." The insured proved that manic-depressive
illness had an organic cause. Nonetheless, in his last published
opinion in a civil case, Justice Brauer reasoned:
The language of either policy is simply not susceptible of
the construction that only functionally but not organically
caused mental illnesses are excluded. Manifestation, not
cause, is the yardstick.2' °
Justice Brauer acknowledged that an Arkansas appellate court had
reached the opposite conclusion in an identical case.2 4 However,
he believed that, regardless of the medical profession's
236. Id at 1025, 804 P.2d. at 689, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
237. Id at 1026-27, 804 P.2d at 699, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
238. 212 Cal. App. 3d 832, 260 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1989).
239. Id at 840-41, 260 Cal. Rplr. at 824-25.
240. Id at 840, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
241. Id at 840-41 n.2, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 824 n.2. See Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc.
v. Doe, 22 Ark. App. 89, 733 S.W.2d 429, 432 (1987) (holding that sufficient evidence supported
the trial court's decision to classify manic-depressive illness by cause rather than symptom).
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categorization of the illness, a lay person would classify an illness
as physical or mental based upon the symptoms rather than the
cause.
242
The federal courts likewise are divided on the issue decided in
Berry. The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the treatment of autism
was not subject to a medical policy's limitation on benefits for
treatment of "mental illness or nervous disorders."243 The court
found that the term "mental illness" was ambiguous and
concluded that the ambiguity had to be resolved in favor of the
insured to allow for full coverage. 2' By contrast, the Eighth
Circuit has decided that affective mood disorder was subject to
policy limitations for the treatment of mental illnesses.245 The
court agreed with Justice Brauer's rationale: Although medical
experts may judge an illness by its cause, lay persons understand
an illness in terms of its symptoms.
246
The rationale of the Eighth Circuit and the Sixth District in
Berry -- that lay persons would classify affective mood disorder or
manic-depressive illness as a mental illness -- seems questionable.
The reasoning has superficial appeal in that a current Gallup Poll
might reveal that a majority of lay persons believe that those
illnesses are mental diseases. The results of such a poll could very
well change, however, if the public were informed that the medical
profession (1) had determined that those illnesses have physical
causes; and (2) had classified those illnesses as organic, rather than
mental. Although Justice Brauer and the Eighth Circuit correctly
stated that medical experts should not resolve insurance coverage
questions, public perception can change, depending upon the
information to which the public has access.
The Ninth Circuit rule seems better reasoned. If the insurance
policy does not define the term "mental illness" and conflicting
evidence exists regarding the classification of the illness, a court
242. Berry, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 840-41 n.2, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 824 n.2.
243. Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. den.
111 S. Ct. 581 (1990).
244. IM at 541.
245. Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1990).
246. Id
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should find that the insurance policy is ambiguous concerning
coverage of the illness at issue. Then, applying a standard rule of
construction, the court should resolve the ambiguity in favor of
coverage. Had the Ninth Circuit rule been applied in Equitable
Life, the court would have found coverage under the disability
policy because that policy apparently did not define the term
"mental or nervous disorders." On the other hand, the benefits
limitation in the medical policy would have applied. That
restriction extended to "mental and/or nervous treatment," defined
as "treatment for a neurosis, psychoneurosis, psychopathy,
psychosis, or mental or nervous disease or disorder of any kind."
Manic-depressive illness certainly would come within that broad
definition.
In United Services Automobile Association v. Baggett,247 the
Sixth District construed a car insurance policy to favor the insurer
in a wrongful death action. The policy provided maximum
coverage for bodily injury of $100,000 per person and $300,000
per accident. The insured's car struck the decedent's car on a
freeway. The two drivers parked their cars and discussed the
accident outside their cars. Within sixty seconds, a third vehicle
struck the insured's car, thereby driving it into the decedent and
killing her. The decedent's heirs claimed that the insured was
negligent in three respects: (1) driving his car; (2) stopping his car
without flashing a warning signal; and (3) guiding the decedent to
a perilous position.48 The heirs and the insured claimed that
there were two accidents, not one, and thus, the insurer's maximum
liability should be two times the maximum amount of coverage in
the policy.249 The court of appeal ruled that two consecutive
collisions were intended to be treated as one accident under the
policy.' 0 The court expressly relied upon the causation test set
forth in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kohl.2? Under that
test:
247. 209 Cal. App. 3d 1387, 258 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1989).
248. Id at 1390, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
249. Id at 1391, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
250. Id at 1396, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
251. 131 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 182 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1982).
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[A] single uninterrupted course of conduct which gives rise
to a number of injuries or incidents of property damage is
one "accident" or "occurrence." On the other hand, if the
original cause is interrupted or replaced by another cause,
then there is more than one "accident" or
,,occurrence. , , 52
However, the Sixth District misinterpreted the teachings of Kohl.
In Kohl, coverage under both a homeowner's policy and an
auto policy of the insured were at issue. The insured's truck struck
a woman, who was riding a motorcycle, and caused her to hit the
pavement and sustain severe injuries. Immediately after the
accident, the insured got out of his truck and negligently dragged
the motorcyclist from the street, thereby causing her to suffer
additional serious injuries. The insurer apparently conceded
coverage, under the auto policy, for the injuries which the
motorcyclist suffered in the traffic accident. The court of appeal
held that coverage existed under the insured's homeowner's policy
for the injuries stemming from the insured's negligent dragging of
the victim. 3
In Kohl, the court explained that the insured's dragging of the
motorcyclist was an independent negligent act, which was unrelated
to the insured's negligent driving of his truck, even though the
insured's use of the truck put the victim in a place which resulted
in additional injuries to her. 4 Thus, on facts remarkably similar
to the facts in Baggett, the Kohl court applied the causation test so
as to find additional coverage, albeit under a separate insurance
policy, for the loss which the insured may incur from his second
act of negligence immediately following the traffic accident.
In Kohl, the court stated in dictum that the auto policy also
would cover the insured's loss resulting from the insured's
negligent dragging of the motorcyclist because that second act of
1099
252. Kohl, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 1035, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 721 (emphasis in original); Baggett, 209
Cal. App. 3d at 1393, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
253. Kohl, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 1039, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 723-24.
254. Md
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negligence was a foreseeable consequence of his use and operation
of the insured vehicle. 5' In Baggett, the Sixth District claimed
that the Kohl dictum supported its conclusion because, according
to the Sixth District's interpretation of Kohl, all of the
motorcyclist's personal injuries purportedly were deemed to be
"caused" by the insured's negligent driving, for the purposes of
the insurance coverage issue. 6 However, the dictum in Kohl has
the exact opposite meaning. To say that the negligent dragging was
covered by the auto insurance policy is not to say that the insured's
two acts of negligence produced a single cause of the
motorcyclist's injuries. On the issue of the existence of coverage,
the Kohl dictum means only that both the insured's negligent
driving and his negligent conduct immediately following the traffic
accident were covered under the auto policy. As the Sixth District
decided, the same conclusion applies in Baggett. On the separate
issue of causation, however, the Kohl court held that the insured's
post-accident conduct involved "an independent negligent act"
which was subject to coverage under the homeowner's policy.2 57
The court necessarily found that the negligent dragging constituted
a separate accident, or else there could not have been coverage
under that policy. No accident means no coverage. Applying this
analysis to Baggett, the Sixth District should have decided, as the
court did in Kohl, that the insured's post-accident conduct involved
an independent negligent act which caused a separate accident. The
result should have been separate coverage for the separate accident
under the insurance policy.
In Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Vaughn,58 the Sixth
District denied coverage under a homeowner's policy for an
accident which resulted in the death of the insured's wife. The
policy contained an exclusion for bodily injury of any relative of
the insured. The insured's spouse was killed while operating a
tractor on the insured's property. The court of appeal correctly
1 1O
255. Idi at 1035, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
256. Baggett, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1394-95, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 57-58.
257. Kohl, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 1039, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
258. 199 Cal. App. 3d 171, 244 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1988).
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concluded that the plain and unambiguous exclusion precluded
coverage.2 9
The court reached a similar result in Mid-Century Insurance
Co. v. Haynes." The auto policy at issue provided coverage for
the insured and her family members in the amount of $100,000 for
injuries to a single person and $300,000 for injuries to more than
one person in a single accident. The policy limited coverage for
non-family members, who used the insured vehicle with the
permission of the insurer, to the limits of the Financial
Responsibility Law. 261 That law requires a car insurance policy
to provide coverage in the minimum amounts of $15,000 for
injuries to a single person and $30,000 for injuries to more than
one person in one accident.262 When an unrelated user of the
insured's car caused an accident while driving her car, the insured
claimed that the $100,000/$300,000 policy limits should apply. The
court of appeal rejected that argument, holding that the policy
plainly and unambiguously restricted coverage in this situation to
the $15,000/$30,000 limits in the Financial Responsibility Law.263
In two insurance coverage cases, the Sixth District ruled for the
insured, although one of those decisions was not based upon an
analysis of insurance law.
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. V. Eddy,264 the Sixth
District held that a homeowner's policy could provide coverage for
the insured's unintentional transmission of herpes to another party
through an act of consensual sexual intercourse.6" The policy
covered any personal liability of the insured for damages resulting
from bodily injury, which was defined as "harm, sickness or
disease." 2(' The insured was sued after he had caused another
259. Id at 181, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
260. 218 Cal. App. 3d 737, 267 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1990).
261. Id. at 739, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 249. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 16000 et seq. (West 1971)
(Financial Responsibility Law).
262. CAL. VEi. CODE § 16056(a) (West Supp. 1991).
263. Mid-Century, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 742, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
264. 218 Cal. App. 3d 958, 267 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1990).
265. Id at 972, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
266. Id. at 964, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
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party to contract herpes. 267 The insured claimed that he was
unaware that he had herpes at the time of the sexual act in
question; in fact, a medical test taken nine months before the
sexual act at issue indicated that he did not have herpes. In the
insurer's declaratory relief action, the trial court granted summary
judgment for the insured.2" The court of appeal reversed, finding
that coverage may exist, if the insured had no intent to harm, even
though the loss was caused by his intentional act.269
Distinguishing cases involving criminal sexual misconduct (where
the intent to injure may be inferred from an unlawful sexual
act)27 the court followed two out-of-state cases which had
arrived at the same conclusion.27
The Sixth District reversed another summary judgment in favor
of an insurer in Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Marino. The insured had a homeowner's policy which covered
liability for bodily injury, but excluded personal injuries which the
insured intentionally caused.273 The insured shot two persons, one
of whom died. 4 The surviving victim, who was the father of the
decedent, sued the insured for personal injuries and the wrongful
death of his son. When the insured claimed coverage, the
insurer brought an action for declaratory relief.2 76 After the
insured was convicted of second degree murder in federal court, the
insurer brought a summary judgment motion in the coverage action,
based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel.' The trial court
granted the motion, finding that the insured's conduct was willful
267. Id at 963, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
268. Id at 963, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
269. Id at 971-72, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
270. Id at 969-70, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
271. Id at 971, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (following State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Irene S., 138
A.D.2d 589,591,526 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (1988); North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138,
141 (Minn. App. 1988).
272. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1083, 246 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1988).
273. Id at 1086, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
274. Id at 1085, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
275. Id at 1086, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
276. Id
277. Id at 1086-87, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12.
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and intentional. 8 After the trial court's ruling in the coverage
action, the Ninth Circuit granted the insured's habeas corpus
petition in the criminal case.279
In Marino, the Sixth District concluded that the Ninth Circuit's
intervening decision rendered summary judgment inappropriate in
the coverage action.28° The court observed that the trial court
necessarily relied upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel; the lower
court could not have resolved the factual issue of the insured's
intent in a summary judgment proceeding, particularly where there
was evidence that the insured may have acted in self-defense.281
The court of appeal further reasoned that the judgment in the
criminal action was extinguished by the Ninth Circuit's decision
and thus, the predicate for the application of collateral estoppel
vanished.2 Absent the doctrine of collateral estoppel, summary
judgment was improper because there remained triable issues of
fact regarding the intent of the insured.283 Accordingly, the Sixth
District's decision rested upon its application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, rather than on principles of insurance law.
B. The Sixth District Tended to Favor Insurers in Bad Faith Cases
Apart from coverage issues, the Sixth District issued three
decisions in cases involving claims of bad faith on the part of an
insurer. The insurers prevailed in two of those cases. The insured
won the other case284 which, because it was decided under
Nevada law, will not be discussed in this Article.
In Gagnon v. Continental Casualty Co.,285 the insurer
terminated the benefits of the insured under a disability insurance
policy. The insured brought an action against the insurer for,
among other things, breach of fiduciary duty, issuing a deceptive
278. Id. at 1087, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
279. Marvin v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 507 (9th Cir. 1987).
280. Marino, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1089, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
281. Id at 1088, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
282. Id. at 1088-89, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
283. Id
284. Denham v. Farmers Insurance Co, 213 Cal. App. 3d. 1061, 262 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1989).
285. 211 Cal. App. 3d 1598, 260 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1989).
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brochure and bad faith settlement practices. The insured died before
trial. The jury awarded the wife of the insured $70,000 in
emotional distress damages and $2,500,000 in punitive damages.
In Gagnon, the court of appeal reversed the award of punitive
damages, concluding that the trial judge had erred by failing to
instruct the jury that the amount of punitive damages must bear a
reasonable relation to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.286 The
trial judge had declined to use or adapt BAI No. 14.71, which
states that "punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the
actual damages,"" 7 because punitive damages could be awarded
to the insured's wife only in her representative capacity and she
was not entitled to any actual damages in that capacity.28 8 The
Sixth District reasoned that, although the amount of compensatory
damages is a useful tool in fixing an award of punitive damages,
it is "the nature and degree of the actual harm suffered by the
plaintiff" to which the award of punitive damages must bear a
reasonable relation.2 9 Therefore, even though the decedent was
entitled to no actual damages, the trial judge should have adapted
BAI No. 14.71 to read that the punitive damages must bear a
reasonable relation to the magnitude of the actual injury sustained
by the plaintiff.2' Although the court's decision deprived a
sympathetic plaintiff of her large award of punitive damages, the
result and rationale seem correct.
In Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court,29' the action
arose out of a mud slide which damaged the plaintiffs' property.
Eventually, the injured plaintiffs, rather than the insured, sued the
insurer for unfair competition under Business and Professions Code
section 17203, 292  and for unfair business practices under
Insurance Code section 790.03(h). 293 The Sixth District issued
two significant rulings. First, the court held that a plaintiff may not
286. la at 1605, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
287. B.AJ.L 14.71.
288. Gagnon, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1602, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
289. Id. at 1603-04, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08.
290. Id. at 1605, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
291. 209 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 257 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1989).
292. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 1987) (unfair competition).
293. See CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1991) (unfair business practices).
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recover damages in an action for unfair competition under
section 17203.294 That ruling was consistent with a multitude of
federal cases and one California case which had considered the
issue.9 Second, the Sixth District concluded that the supreme
court's decision in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Companies96 abolished a private action for any party under
Insurance Code section 790.03(h). 27  As the Moradi-Shalal
holding necessarily was limited to third-party actions against
insurers, the plaintiffs in Industrial Indemnity claimed that they
should be treated as first parties because they were intended
beneficiaries under the insurance policy.29 The court of appeal
disagreed, deciding that neither first party nor third-party actions
under section 790.03(h) survived Moradi-Shalal. Another court has
followed the Sixth District's second ruling in Industrial
Indemnity.299
V. EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES
In contrast to 1985-1987, when employers prevailed in all of
the court's reported employment law cases, the Sixth District
occasionally ruled for the employee in such cases in 1988-1990.
The court's seven wrongful termination cases involving a private
employer showed a nearly even split. As in tort cases, the court
ruled in favor of the government in both of the two minor public
294. Industrial Indemnity, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1094-96, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 656-57.
295. E.W. French & Sons, Inc., v. General Portland Inc., 885 F.2d 1392, 1401-02 (9th Cir.
1989); Little Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 852 F.2d 441, 445 (9th Cir. 1988); Kates v. Crocker
Nat'l Bank, 776 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1985); MetaFilm Assoc., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp.
1346, 1363 (C.D.Cal. 1984); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758,
774, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 799-800 (1989).
296. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 304, 758 P.2d 58, 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 133 (1988).
297. Industrial Indemnity, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1094 and 1097,257 Cal. Rptr. at 656 and 657.
298. ld. at 1097, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
299. Zephyr Park v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 833, 837 n.4, 262 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109
n.4 (1989) (distinguishing Industrial Indemnity as a "'third party" case, but adopting its conclusion).
In Henry v. Associated Indemn. Corp., 217 Cal. App. 3d 1405, 1415,266 Cal. Rptr. 578, 584 (1990),
the same court stated that Industrial Indemnity and Zephyr Park reached opposite conclusions. The
Henry court was simply wrong.
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employee cases. Finally, the court favored employers over unions
in three labor cases.
A. The Sixth District's Decisions in Private Employer Cases Were
Evenly Split
1. Rulings for Employers
In Andersen v. Pacific Bell,3" the court affirmed a summary
judgment in favor of the employer against twenty-three
plaintiffs."' The plaintiffs claimed that they had experienced
emotional distress when their employer forced them, through
disciplinary threats, to engage in marketing practices which
subsequently were found to be illegal. 2 None of the plaintiffs
was a "whistleblower" and only one of them actually had been
disciplined, a one-day suspension which the employer later
revoked. 3 None of the plaintiffs resigned. Rather than state a
cause of action for infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiffs
pleaded a cause of action for constructive wrongful termination in
violation of public policy." 4 Finding that the plaintiffs actually
sought to recover for retaliatory discipline, the court of appeal
determined that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages. °"
None of them, except one, suffered any discipline or discharge:
°0
As for the one employee who had been suspended, the court
determined that the employer's revocation of her suspension
rendered her bereft of economic damage and thus, she had no
viable claim for damages. 7 In this regard, the court's rationale
was that the disciplined employee could not recover the only
damages which she claimed -- damages for emotional distress --
300. 204 Cal. App. 3d 277, 251 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1988).
301. Id. at 281, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
302. Id. at 282-83, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 283, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
305. Id. at 283-84, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
306. Id.
307. I& at 284-85, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
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because she lacked the requisite "substantial damages apart from
emotional distress."3 8
In Andersen, the Sixth District's employment law analysis
seems correct. If one plaintiff's discipline had been rescinded and
all other plaintiffs had never been disciplined, then no plaintiff had
a meritorious action for retaliatory discipline. However, another
court has criticized the Sixth District's tort analysis in Andersen. In
Pintor v. Ong,"°9 the First District Court of Appeal questioned the
Sixth District's explanation that "substantial damages apart from
emotional distress" were a prerequisite for the recovery of
damages for emotional distress.31° In advancing its critique, the
Pintor court pointed to the rulings in the California Supreme
Court's two decisions in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals3 1 and Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical
Clinic, Inc."12 In Marlene F., the supreme court, citing Molien,
prescribed the following rule:
Damages for severe emotional distress.. . are recoverable
in a negligence action when they result from the breach of
a duty owed the plaintiff that is assumed by the defendant
or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that
arises out of a relationship between the two.313
The Marlene F. rule supports the First District's observation in
Pintor that damages are recoverable when the only harm is serious
emotional distress. 4
Even more to the point, in Thing v. La Chusa,315 the
California Supreme Court, amidst its lengthy analysis of the right
to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, stated:
308. Id
309. 211 Cal. App. 3d 837, 259 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1989).
310. Id at 845, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
311. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
312. 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989).
313. Id at 590, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
314. Pintor, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 845, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
315. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
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Our own prior decisions identify factors that will
appropriately circumscribe the right to damages, but do not
deny recovery to plaintiffs whose emotional injury is real
even if not accompanied by out-of-pocket expense.1 6
Although Andersen was decided prior to Marlene F. and Thing,
the supreme court observed that its past decisions established the
two above-quoted rules. Applying those rules to Andersen, all
twenty-three plaintiffs could have plead and perhaps proven claims
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, none of
them elected to make that attempt. The result in Andersen appears
correct, in view of the fact that the plaintiffs essentially brought
claims for retaliatory discipline, but were unable to prove any
discipline which a court could remedy.
In Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co.,317 the Sixth District
again affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the employer. An
employment contract provided that there was no agreement for
employment for any specific period of time and that the
employment contract could be terminated with or without cause.
After the plaintiff was discharged, she brought an action against her
former employer for wrongful termination and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Following its
earlier decision in Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers
International,"'8 the court of appeal concluded that the
employment contract was integrated regarding the grounds for
termination and plainly provided that the employer could discharge
the plaintiff with or without cause. 319 The court's interpretation
of the employment contract effectively disposed of both the
termination without good cause claim and the breach of the implied
320
covenant claim.
316. Id at 663, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
317. 221 Cal. App. 3d 799, 270 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1990).
318. 190 Cal. App. 3d 263, 270-72, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279, 282-83 (1987).
319. Slivinsky, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 804-05, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
320. Id at 806, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
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In Panopulos v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,321 the court
decided a question of first impression: Whether a cause of action
for constructive discharge based upon a breach of contract theory,
survived the supreme court's decision in Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp.322 The Sixth District held that a contractual claim of
constructive wrongful discharge is alive and well.323 However,
the court decided that the plaintiff did not present sufficient proof
to defeat the employer's summary judgment motion on that claim,
finding that the plaintiff admitted that he had endured allegedly
intolerable working conditions, following a job transfer imposed by
the employer, for five years before he retired and brought his
324action. In reaching that result, the Sixth District declined to
adopt the strict rule of one federal court. In Wagner v. Sanders
Associates, Inc.,325 a district court announced that an employee,
who does not immediately resign upon the commencement of the
purportedly intolerable working conditions, is barred from bringing
a constructive discharge action.326 The Sixth District rejected that
standard and embraced the test whereby each constructive
discharge case is decided on its facts. Under that test, the length of
time that the employee remains on the job, in spite of allegedly
intolerable working conditions, is just one of many factors to
consider.327 Applying that test, the court properly ruled that five
years was simply too long; the employee's tolerance of the working
conditions for five years established the inference that the
conditions were not intolerable.
Another employment law case involved a doctor's discipline by
a hospital. In Rhee v. El Camino Hospital District,328 a surgeon
was placed on probation, following an initial investigation and
administrative hearing by the hospital.3 29 Contrary to the
321. 216 Cal. App. 3d 660, 264 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1989).
322. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
323. Panopulos, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 667, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
324. Ma at 670-71, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 816-17.
325. 638 F. Supp. 742 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
326. Id. at 745.
327. Panopulos, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 669, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
328. 201 Cal. App. 3d 477, 247 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1988).
329. Id at 483-86 Cal. Rptr. at 246-48.
1109
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
hospital's bylaws, the surgeon never received a copy of the final
decision which resulted from the first proceeding. After a second
investigation and hearing two years later, the hospital restricted the
doctor's surgical privileges to only two types of surgeries. The
doctor filed an administrative mandamus action and the trial court
granted a writ.
3 30
In Rhee, the Sixth District reversed. The court rejected the
doctor's argument that the hospital had denied him fair procedure
by permitting several doctors to have overlapping functions in the
investigation and adjudicatory proceedings . 31 That determination
certainly was correct; none of the seven doctors, whom the plaintiff
challenged, were involved in more than one stage in the second
round of proceedings. Thus, there was no danger of bias to the
plaintiff as a result of a decision-maker reviewing charges or an
investigative report which he or she had drafted.33 ' The court
likewise dismissed the plaintiff's contention that he had not
received notice of the "charge" that his caseload was insufficient
to enable him to improve his surgical skills. 3 3 Here, the court
determined that the hospital's finding of inadequate caseload
actually was extraneous to the central issue of the level of the
plaintiff's performance in surgery.3 Thus, according to the
court, no unfairness resulted from the hospital's failure to notify the
plaintiff that the hospital would consider the issue of inadequate
caseload.35
The court of appeal further concluded in Rhee that the
hospital's violation of its bylaws, by not providing the plaintiff
with a copy of the written decision after the first proceeding, did
not constitute a denial of fair procedure.336 In this regard, the
plaintiff contended that he was prejudiced because the first decision
emphasized that he did not have a sufficient surgery caseload and
330. Id at 486-88 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49.
331. Id at 494, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
332. Id at 490-94, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 251-53.
333.. Id at 495-97, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 254-55.
334. Id at 496, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
335. Id at 495-97, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 254-55.
336. Id at 497-99, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 256-57.
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thus, he would have been alerted to the significance of that issue
in the eyes of the hospital.337 The court rejected that point as
well, noting that one of the charges and some of the evidence in
the first proceeding concerned the plaintiff's inadequate
caseload.33 It seems that the court missed the plaintiff's point
that his receipt of the first decision would have allowed him to
conduct his affairs differently both prior to and during the second
proceeding. If he had known that the first decision emphasized his
insufficient caseload, perhaps he would have taken drastic
corrective action and avoided the second proceeding.
There is a conflict in the decisions of the courts of appeal over
whether "fair procedure" mandates that a private hospital observe
its bylaws at all stages in disciplinary proceedings against the
doctor. In some cases, like Rhee and the case upon which Rhee
relied, the courts have determined that fair procedure does not
require a private hospital to adhere to its bylaws, so long as the
hospital provides the doctor with a fair hearing at some stage in the
proceedings.339 Other courts have held that a private hospital
must follow all procedural requirements of its bylaws before it may
deprive a doctor of staff privileges at the hospital.34 The holding
in the latter cases finds support in public agency cases, which
conclude that a discharge of a public employee is void if the public
agency has failed to observe the procedures specified in the
governing statute or ordinance.341
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court will need to resolve
this conflict. The supreme court should bring the hospital cases in
line with the public agency cases. As the supreme court has stated,
a private hospital must render decisions regarding hospital
privileges of physicians in conformity with the minimal requisites
337. Ia at 498, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
338. Id at 497-99, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 256-57.
339. Id at 497; Tiholiz v. Northridge Hosp. Found., -151 Cal. App. 3d 1197, 1203, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 338, 341 (1984).
340. See, e.g., Hackethal v. Loma Linda Community Hosp. Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d 59,67, 153
Cal. Rptr. 783, 788 (1979); Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 650,
114 Cal. Rptr. 681, 698 (1974).
341. See, e.g., Layton v. Merit System Comn'n, 60 Cal. App. 3d 58, 63, 131 Cal. Rptr. 318,
321-22 (1976).
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of "fair procedure."342 The courts repeatedly state that the fair
procedure doctrine affords an individual the same level of
protection furnished by the state due process clause. 43 Given that
due process is the standard in a public employee discipline case,
the supreme court should rule that a court, in deciding a doctor
discipline case, must apply the due process rules set forth in the
public employee cases.
2.. Rulings for Employees
In three private employer cases, the Sixth District ruled in favor
of the employee. In two of those cases, the court applied the parol
evidence rule so as to fimd that an employment agreement could be
terminated only for good cause.
In McLain v. Great American Insurance,344 the court affirmed
a judgment for the employee in a wrongful termination action. The
court first determined that the written employment agreement at
issue was not integrated because it: (1) was a standardized form;
(2) did not exhaustively cover the terms of employment; and (3)
stated that the terms of employment could be altered with or
without cause and with or without notice.345 In this regard, the
court distinguished its decision in Gerdlund,346  where the
employment agreement contained an integration clause, was drafted
with the employee's participation, thoroughly covered the terms of
employment, and contained a termination provision which provided
that the employer could discharge the employee "for any
cause." 347 In McLain, extrinsic evidence was admissible to
342. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 825,567 P.2d 1162, 1175, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 455 (1977).
343. Lasko v. Valley Presbyterian Hosp., 180 Cal. App. 3d 519,528, 225 Cal. Rptr. 603, 608
(1986); Hacketbal v. California Medical Ass'n, 138 Cal. App. 3d 435, 442, 187 Cal. Rptr. 811, 815
(1982); Applebaum v. Board of Directors, 104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 657, 163 Cal. Rptr. 831, 836
(1980).
344. 203 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 256 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1989).
345. Id at 1485, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
346. Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers Int'l, 190 Cal. App. 3d 263,271-72,235 Cal. Rptr. 279,
282-83 (1987).
347. McLain, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1484-85,256 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68.
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ascertain the nature of the parties' agreement regarding the need for
cause to terminate."' The court concluded that substantial
evidence supported the findings below that there was an implied
agreement that the employee could be terminated only for good
cause and that the employer violated the implied agreement.349
In Wallis v. Farmers Group, Inc. ,350 the court applied the
parol evidence rule in an action for wrongful termination of an
insurance agency contract. The written agreement exhaustively
treated the topic of termination and provided a termination review
procedure. For this reason, the court found that the agreement was
integrated as to the subject of termination. 51 However, the court
concluded that parol evidence was admissible because the
integrated termination provisions were silent regarding whether or
not good cause was a prerequisite for termination.352 Based upon
the testimony of the defendant's officers, who apparently believed
that the agency agreement could be terminated only for good cause,
the court of appeal found that the parties had an implied-in-fact
agreement that the agency relationship would not be terminated
except for good cause.353 Ultimately, the court decided that
substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that the defendant
did not have good cause in terminating the agency.35 4 Therefore,
the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff under her
breach of contract claims. 5
In Kerr v. Rose,356 the Sixth District reversed a summary
judgment in favor of the employer in a wrongful termination
action. The employer had a policy of recalling a laid off employee
for an open position at the same level as the position which he or
she formerly held, provided that the former employee was qualified
for the open position, before hiring better qualified persons for the
348. Id at 1485, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
349. Id at 1487, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
350. 220 Cal. App. 3d 718, 269 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1990).
351. Id at 730, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 305-06.
352. Id at 730-31, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
353. Id at 733, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
354. Id at 733-34, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 307-08.
355. Id at 725-26, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
356. 216 Cal. App. 3d 1551, 265 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1990).
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open position." 7 The plaintiff sued his former employer because
he was never reinstated following a layoff.35 The court of appeal
ruled that the employer was obligated to prove that no positions at
the employee's former level had opened following his layoff or, if
any such positions had opened, the plaintiff was not qualified for
those positions.5 9 The employer did not make either showing and
thus, was not entitled to summary judgment.36
B. The Sixth District Ruled for the Government in Two Public
Employer Cases
The Sixth District decided two public employer cases which
were not as significant as the court's private employer decisions.
In both of these cases, the court approved the termination of a
probationary teacher. In Royster v. Cushman,361 the court held
that the teacher had no right to reemployment as a probationary
teacher because she was not qualified to serve as a bilingual
teacher since she had not made progress toward receiving a
bilingual credential, as required by law.362 The court's decision
was proper in view of the mandate of the statutes which it applied.
In Fleice v. Chualar Union Elementary School District,363 the
court ruled that a probationary teacher, whom the school district
had mistakenly and invalidly classified as a tenured teacher, was
not entitled to keep her tenured position.3" Again, the court
properly applied the governing statutes.
357. Id at 1560, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
358. Id at 1555, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
359. Id. at 1560, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
360. Id at 1560-61, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
361. 213 Cal. App. 3d 65, 261 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1989).
362. Id at 71, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 461-62.
363. 206 Cal. App. 3d 886, 254 Cal. Rptr. 54 (1988).
364. Id at 888, 893, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 55, 58.
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C. The Sixth District Favored Management Over Unions in Labor
Law Cases
The Sixth District decided three actions involving labor
disputes. The employer won two of those cases and prevailed on
the important issues in the third case.
In J.R. Norton Co. v. General Teamsters, Warehousemen &
Helpers Union, Local 890,365 the court of appeal held that a
union's liability for the wrongful conduct of union members during
a strike is governed by California state agency principles, rather
than federal labor law.36 The employer sustained property
damage at the hands of union members during a strike. The
employer sued the union for, among other things, negligent
supervision of the striking members.3 67 A jury returned a verdict
for the employer.68 On appeal, the union argued that the trial
court erred when it instructed the jury on the standard by which the
union could be held liable for the acts of its members, as well as
on the standard of proof.31 Specifically, the union contended that
the trial judge should not have used state law agency principles,
coupled with the preponderance of the evidence standard; instead,
the trial court should have used only section 6370 of the federal
Norris-LaGuardia Act,371 with its clear evidence standard of
proof.372 The Sixth District concluded that the federal standard
365. 208 Cal. App. 3d 430, 256 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 242 (1989).
366. Id at 443,256 Cal. Rptr. at 253-54. Accord, Maggio, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 227
Cal. App. 3d 847, 858-59, 278 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256, (1991) (reciting the holding in J.Rl Norton as
California law without analyzing the underlying issues).
367. Id at 434, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
368. Id at 434, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
369. Id at 437, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
370. 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1987).
371. Id §§ 100-115.
372. J.R Norton, 308 Cal. App. 3d at 437-38, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 250. Section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act provides:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or
organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or
liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers,
members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual
authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 106 (1987).
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for the liability of unions did not preempt California's agency
rules."' The court found significant the fact that the legislature,
although it used federal labor statutes as a model for some
California labor statutes, did not incorporate the section 6 standard
of liability or standard of proof.374
In Norton, the Sixth District adopted the minority view without
a persuasive rationale. As the court noted, the preemption issue has
been decided by nine out-of-state courts: Six courts decided that
the section 6 standards apply to tort actions in state courts and
three courts ruled that state agency rules apply in such actions.375
Also, the court cited only one section, out of the fifteen sections in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which the legislature adopted as a
California labor statute.376 Thus, this is not a situation where the
legislature adopted virtually every provision of a federal act, except
the one under scrutiny. The legislature's omission of section 6 from
California's labor laws seems insignificant.
The United States Supreme Court has expressed the
congressional intent underlying section 6 as follows:
[T]he simple concern of Congress was that unions had been
found liable for violence and other illegal acts occurring in
labor disputes which they had never authorized or ratified
and for which they should not be held responsible.
Congress discerned a tendency in courts to blame unions
for everything occurring during a strike.377
373. J.R Norton, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 443, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 253-54.
374. Id. at 441-42, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53.
375. I& at 440-41 & nn. 7-9, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 252 & nn.7-9 (citing Heistand v. Amalgamated
Meatcutters, 233 Kan. 759, 666 P.2d 671 (1983); Sowels v. Laborers' Int.l Union, 112 Mich. App.
616, 317 N.W.2d 195 (1981); Melancon v. United Ass'n of Journeyman, 386 S.2d 669 (la. App.
1980), writ refused, 387 So.2d 596 (La. 1980); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Long, 362
So.2d 987 (Fla. App. 1978); United Aircraft Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 161 Conn.
79,285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Gonzales v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Int'l Union, 77 N.M. 61,419 P.2d 257 (1966); R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers
of Am., 270 N.C. 160, 154 S.E.2d 344 (1967); Carter-Glogau Laboratories, Inc. v. Construction,
Production & Maintenance Laborers' Local 383, 153 Ariz. 351, 736 P.2d 1163 (1986); Buchanan v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 94 Wash.2d 508, 617 P.2d 1004 (1980)).
376. I& at 441-42, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53.
377. Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302, 310 (1971).
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For this reason, Congress required federal courts to apply the
section 6 standards, rather than common law agency rules, in
deciding the liability of unions for the wrongful conduct of union
members. The standards should be the same when an action is filed
in state court rather than federal court, as six out-of-state courts
have recognized. In Norton, the Sixth District did not provide a
satisfactory justification for the use of different standards.
Bertuccio v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board78 was a case
which involved a protracted labor dispute with numerous
administrative proceedings and a plethora of complex issues.
Although the Sixth District decided some issues in favor of the
union, the court ruled in favor of the employer on most of the key
issues. The court first ruled that the employer could accept the
union's proposal for a labor contract after he had rejected it, given
that the union had never withdrawn it.379 Here, the court relied
upon the Ninth Circuit's test set forth in Presto Casting Co. v.
N.L.R.B.:... A rejected offer can be accepted within a reasonable
period of time unless (1) it has been expressly withdrawn; (2) it
was contingent upon a condition subsequent; or (3) subsequent
events would make acceptance of the offer unfair. 81 The court
also decided that the board could not award "make whole"
whereby the employee receives the benefits of the labor contract
which would have been adopted, but for the unfair labor practices
of the employer or the union to any employee, for any period of
time that the employee was on strike. 82 In another significant
ruling, the court, after finding that the employer unlawfully refused
to bargain, remanded the matter to the board to determine whether
make whole was appropriate for non-striking employees; the court
directed the board to order make whole, unless the employer could
prove that his unlawful refusal to bargain did not prevent the
parties from entering into a labor contract.383 Finally, the court
378. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1369, 249 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1988).
379. Xa. at 1385, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
380. 708 F.2d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983).
381. Bertuccio, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1381, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
382. Id. at 1398, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
383. Id, at 1391-92, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85.
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understandably ruled that an employer was not required to reinstate
a union employee who had committed violent acts on the
employer's property during the strike.3
In Breaux v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board,38 5 Justice
Bamattre-Manoukian's first reported opinion in a civil case, the
Sbith District set aside the board's procedures for the
reimbursement of union members for their pro rata shares of dues
and assessments which are used for the union's political activities
that some members find objectionable. 386 The court determined
that the board's procedures were deficient in four respects. First,
the board did not adequately define the expenditures which the
union could make over the objection of any member; such
expenditures should be restricted to those which are reasonably or
necessarily incurred in connection with the performance of the
duties of a bargaining agent for the union members in dealing with
the employer on work-related issues.38 7 Second, the union had to
place in escrow all amounts of dues and other assessments which
are reasonably in dispute by virtue of objections by union
members, pending a decision on the objections.388 Third, the
union must provide, with every assessment of dues or other
charges, a clear statement of the allocations which the union will
make with the amounts collected, so as to enable union members
to make an informed decision regarding the propriety of the
union's expenditures.389 Finally, the union must furnish an
impartial decision-maker to decide the objections of members to
the union's expenditures. The decision-maker cannot be a
committee, board, or agency of the union.'" As the court
expressly relied upon six United States Supreme Court decisions
and one California Supreme Court decision, the Sixth District's
conclusions were on solid ground.
384. Id. at 1400-01, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
385. 217 Cal. App. 3d 730, 265 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1990).
386. Il at 752, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 916.
387. IM. at 752-54, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 916-17.
388. Id. at 754-55, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 917-18.
389. Ma. at 756, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 918-19.
390. I1& at 757-58, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 919-20.
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VI. ENViRONMENTAL LAW CASES
In 1985-1987, the result in virtually all of the Sixth District's
CEQA decisions was to require a public agency to take additional
measures to comply with CEQA. In 1988-1990, the court's CEQA
opinions show an opposite trend. In seven cases involving CEQA
issues, the court ruled that the public agency had to go back to the
drawing board in only two. In the other five cases, the court held
that the public agency fully complied with the requirements of
CEQA. A consistent theme in those five cases was that the public
agency had performed a proper environmental review in light of
the development stage of the project under review.
A. The Sixth District Regularly Found Compliance With CEQA
In Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council 91 the Sixth District
refused to determine that CEQA imposed on public agencies three
duties advanced by the plaintiffs. In Sierra Club, a developer
sought to build a large housing project on certain property that
served as a habitat for the California Tiger Salamander. The
developer applied for a general plan amendment. After the Draft
Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) was prepared, a local resident
pointed out to the city that a population of the salamander resided
on the project site and that this species of salamander purportedly
was threatened.3" The city halted the environmental review
process to allow for a study of the impact of the project on the
salamander population.393 A report on that study was included in
the Final Environmental Impact Report (FEIR). Also, the city
adopted every mitigation measure concerning the salamander that
was proposed by the California Department of Fish and Game, the
state agency charged with the protection of rare species of plants
391. 222 Cal. App. 3d 30, 271 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1990).
392. 1&. at 36, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
393. Id at 37, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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and animals. Eventually, the city approved the general plan
amendment for the project and the FEIR. 9
On appeal in Sierra Club, the Sixth District decided that the
city had complied with CEQA. The plaintiffs argued that CEQA
contains a species preservation duty which obligates a public
agency to deny approval of a project where the preservation of any
particular species on the project site cannot be guaranteed.395 As
the city had stated in the FEIR that it could not guarantee the
survival of the salamander population on the project site, the
plaintiffs contended that the city had a duty to deny approval of the
project.' The court rejected that argument, observing that
numerous CEQA provisions and guidelines allow a public agency
to approve a project which will have a significant adverse effect on
the environment, if the public agency has found, as the city did in
Sierra Club, that mitigation measures and project alternatives are
infeasible.397
In Sierra Club, the plaintiffs also urged that the city had a
separate duty to deny project approval because project alternatives
existed that would not have a significant adverse effect on the
salamander; in other words, no population of this species of
salamanders existed at alternative locations for the housing
development.398 The court of appeal dismissed that contention as
well, ruling that the city properly found that project alternatives
were infeasible.3 The plaintiffs further argued that the city had
a duty, under CEQA Guideline 15380, ° to determine whether or
not the California Tiger Salamander was a rare or endangered
species. 4°' Again, the court refused to accept that CEQA imposed
such a duty. Here, the court concluded that the term "shall" in
394. Id. at 38, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
395. Id. at 41-42, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 41-42, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99.
398. Id. at 44, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
399. I&
400. 14 CAL. CODE REOS. § 15380(d) (1990) (providing that a species which is not included
on any list of rare or endangered species maintained by a federal or state agency "shall" be deemed
to be rare or endangered, if the species is shown to meet certain specified criteria),
401. Sierra Club, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 44, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
1120
1991 / Court Of Appeal For The Sixth Appellate District
Guideline 15380(d) was intended to be directory rather than
mandatory, as the discussion under that Guideline indicated, and
that CEQA Guidelines do not impose mandatory duties in any
event.' The court also noted that the federal and state agencies
which, by law, maintain official lists of protected species are the
only public agencies which have a duty to classify a species as rare
or endangered. 3
The Sixth District's result and reasoning in Sierra Club are
beyond reproach. However, the opinion contained some problematic
language which a litigant could misuse in a future case.
First, in a footnote, the court limited its holding to the facts in
the case and stated, in dictum, that the result might have been
different, if the last known population of an endangered species
resided on the project site.' However, nothing in CEQA would
require a different result in the hypothetical posed by the court.
Although the same result would be harsh under that scenario, a
court still would have to reject the purported species preservation
duty in CEQA. No California case, statute, or guideline would
allow a court to do otherwise.
Second, the court did not accurately recite the law regarding a
public agency's duties under CEQA. The court stated:
The most important of these [substantive duties under
CEQA] is the provision requiring public agencies to deny
approval of a project with significant adverse effects when
feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures can
substantially lessen such effects. 5
A public agency has no duty to deny project approval under the
circumstances stated by the court. If a proposed project will have
a significant adverse impact on the environment and feasible
alternatives or mitigation measures exist, the public agency has at
402. Id. at 47, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
403. Id&
404. Id& at 42 n.5, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 399 n.5.
405. IdM at 41, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
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least two choices, other than denial of project approval. The public
agency can adopt a feasible alternative or feasible mitigation
measures which would reduce or eliminate the impact of the
project on the environment. Alternatively, a public agency can
approve the project, as proposed, if it makes a finding that the
project alternatives and mitigation measures are infeasible.4°
Third, in another passage in the opinion, the court again
misstated the law. The court remarked:
Plaintiffs also contend that the City was duty bound to "not
approve projects as proposed if there are feasible
alternatives." We certainly agree with this proposition as a
matter of law since that is the mandate of section 21002 as
well as sections 21002.1, subdivision (b) and 2108 1.407
The cited statutes do not compel a public agency to deny approval
of a project simply because there are feasible alternatives. If that
were true, a public agency could never approve a project which had
a feasible alternative. Assuming that the proposed project was
feasible, an objector could compel denial of approval of the
original proposed project by reference to a feasible alternative and,
when the alternative became the proposed project, compel denial
of approval of the alternative by reference to the original proposed
project. The statutes, upon which the court relied, do allow a public
agency to approve a proposed project which will have significant
environmental effects, if the public agency has either: (1) adopted
project alternatives or mitigation measures which lessen the adverse
environmental effects of the project; or (2) made a finding that
project alternatives and mitigation measures are infeasible. The
only case in which CEQA would require denial of project approval
is where: (1) the proposed project will have a significant adverse
impact on the environment; (2) project alternatives or mitigation
measures could reduce or eliminate that impact; and (3) the public
1122
406. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21002.1, 21081 (West 1986).
407. Sierra Club, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 44, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
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agency cannot find that those project alternatives or mitigation
measures are infeasible.
In Schaeffer Land Trust v. San Jose City Council, 8 the court
of appeal approved a city's adoption of a negative declaration in
connection with a general plan amendment which allowed
development of a former golf course. The court held that the
general plan amendment would not have any adverse environmental
consequences because, among other reasons, a general plan is
tentative and further environmental review would be required, once
a detailed, specific project was proposed.' The plaintiffs argued
that that position would be inconsistent with the Sixth District's
prior decision in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of
Supervisors,41 ° which held that a county's adoption of a negative
declaration in connection with a rezoning of certain property was
erroneous. The court answered that Carmel was distinguishable.
Whereas Carmel found that experts disagreed over the
environmental impact of the proposed project on certain wetlands,
Schaeffer Land Trust did not involve any significant environmental
effects.4" Also, whereas Carmel decided that adoption of the
negative declaration would preclude further environmental review
on the issue of the boundaries of the rezoned property vis a vis the
wetlands, Schaeffer Land Trust did not preclude further
environmental review on any issues.412 Thus, the Sixth District
intimated that it was not retreating from Carmel; Schaeffer Land
Trust simply presented a different case.
In a separate ruling in Schaeffer Land Trust, the court also
upheld the city's approval of an EIR in connection with a general
plan amendment which would allow the development of a former
high school property, finding that the EIR sufficiently analyzed the
environmental effects and cumulative impacts of the proposed
project."' Finally, on the issue of the standard of review, the
408. 215 Cal. App. 3d 612, 263 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1989).
409. Id. at 625-26, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
410. 183 Cal. App. 3d 229, 250, 227 Cal. Rptr. 899, 913 (1986).
411. Schaeffer, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 626-27, Cal. Rptr. at 411.
412. Id at 626-27, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
413. Id at 630-32, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 822-24.
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court stated that Public Resources Code section 21168414 applied
in a CEQA action which challenges a public agency's approval of
a general plan or general plan amendment.41 5 However, the Sixth
District overruled the Schaeffer Land Trust conclusion regarding
the standard of review in its Sierra Club decision. In Sierra Club,
the court stated that Public Resources Code section 21168.5416
sets forth the applicable standard of review in an action which
objects to a general plan amendment on CEQA grounds.417
Therefore, the court's statement regarding the applicable standard
of review in Schaeffer Land Trust should be disregarded.
The court again upheld the sufficiency of an EIR in Towards
Responsibility in Planning v. City Council.418 The city approved
an EIR for a large parcel of property which would be developed in
several stages over a number of years. The development would
require additional sewage treatment capacity, which would be
provided by the construction of additional facilities, as the need
arose, in conjunction with the construction of each phase of the
development. The EIR analyzed, among other things, the impact of
the sewage treatment facilities which would be built in connection
with the first phase of the project. The plaintiffs complained that
the EIR did not sufficiently discuss the impact of the proposed
project's inevitable increase in discharge of treated sewage on
regional water quality.419 The court of appeal disagreed, finding
that the analysis of the effect of the project on water quality was
sufficient.42 The court explained:
414. See CAi. PUB. REs. CODE § 21168 (West 1986). Section 21168 adopts the standard of
review in an administrative mandamus action and limits the presentation of evidence to the record
before the public agency at the time that it made its decision, except in unusual circumstances. Id.
415. Schaeffer, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 621, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 816-17.
416. See CAL. PUB. Rts. CODE § 21168.5 (West 1986). Section 21168.5 adopts the standard
of review in a traditional mandamus action and does allow the presentation of any relevant evidence,
including evidence outside the record before the public agency at the time of its decision. Id.
417. Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council, 222 Cal. App. 3d 30,39 n.2, 271 Cal. Rptr. 393,397
n.2 (1990).
418. 200 Cal. App. 3d 671, 246 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1988).
419. Id. at 676-77, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
420. Id. 681, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
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It would be unreasonable to expect this EIR to produce
detailed information about the environmental impacts of a
future regional facility whose scope is uncertain and which
will in any, case be subject to its own environmental review.
The degree of specificity in an EIR need only correspond
to the degree of specificity involved in the underlying
activity which is described in the EIR, here the rezoning of
two properties.4 21
Thus, the court aptly articulated the theme that the level of
environmental review need only match the level of development of
the proposed project under review.
In Towards Responsibility in Planning, the court also rejected
the plaintiff's argument that the city should have waited for the
completion of a five-year study which had been identified in the
EIR, ruling that a public agency need not delay approval of an EIR
for the completion of a potentially relevant work in progress.
422
The court likewise dismissed the plaintiff's contention that the city
had a duty, under Government Code section 65030.2,4" to
prepare a financing plan for the additional sewage treatment
facilities before approving the rezoning. The court concluded that
a cause of action does not arise for the violation of a statute which
merely sets forth a broad legislative policy.424
In Leonoff v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors,4' the
court upheld the county's adoption of a negative declaration in
connection with a use permit for the construction of a large
commercial building. Responding to the plaintiffs' claim that the
county's initial study was inadequate, the court found that the
plaintiffs' expectations were unrealistic because an initial study
421. Id
422. Id
423. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65030.2 (West 1983). Section 65030.2 provides: "It is further
the policy of the state and the intent of the Legislature that land use decisions be made with full
knowledge of their economic and fiscal implications .... - Id,
424. Towards Responsibility in Planning, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 677, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
Accord, Schaeffer Land Trust v. San Jose City Council, 215 Cal. App. 3d 612, 634, 263 Cal. Rptr.
813, 825 (1989).
425. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1337, 272 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1990).
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need not resemble an EIR, with expert evaluations of the
environmental effects of the proposed project.426 Also, the court
recognized that the legislature's adoption of Public Resources Code
section 21082.2427 ended the debate over whether serious public
controversy regarding the environmental impact of a proposed
project, without more, can compel the preparation of an EIR.
Public controversy, alone, is not sufficient evidence to require an
E R.
4 2 8
Lexington Hills Association v. State of California429 involved
a proposal by a private party to conduct a logging operation near
a state highway and to transport the trees over the highway. The
California Department of Forestry approved the timber harvesting
plan for the project and the California Department of
Transportation issued encroachment permits which would allow
flagmen to direct traffic on the highway during the removal and
transportation of trees.430 The issue before the court was whether
CalTrans was obligated to observe CEQA. The court held that
CalTrans had no duty to comply with CEQA, before granting the
encroachment permits, because the issuance of the permits was not
a project.431
B. The Sixth District Required Further Environmental Review in
Two Cases
Laupheimer v. State of California432 involved the same facts
as those in Lexington Hills, including the same logger, but a
different, nearby property. The major legal issue, however, was
426. Id at 1347, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
4.27. See CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21082.2 (West 1986). Section 21082.2 provides, in pertient
part:
The existence of public controversy over the environmental effects of a project shall not
require preparation of an environmental impact report if there is no substantial evidence
before the agency that the project may have a significant effect on the environment.
Id
428. Leonoff, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1358-59, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
429. 200 Cal. App. 3d 415, 246 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988).
430. Id at 421, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
431. Id at 429-30, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
432. 200 Cal. App. 3d 440, 246 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1988).
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whether the Department of Forestry had to comply with the
requirements of CEQA before approving the timber harvesting
plans. Under the pertinent statutory scheme, a logger must prepare
a timber harvesting plan, in lieu of an EIR, and the Forestry
Department must approve the plan, if it satisfies the criteria set
forth in the Z'berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973433 and
related regulations.4' The court of appeal first held that CEQA
does not directly apply to the Forestry Department's approval of a
logging plan.435 However, the court next concluded that the
Forestry Department must consider the cumulative environmental
impacts of a proposed timber harvesting plan, even though a
cumulative impact analysis is not a requirement set forth in the
Forestry Act and regulations. 4 6 Reversing the trial court, the
court ultimately decided that the Forestry Department had not
adequately analyzed the cumulative impacts of the timber
harvesting plan at issue and thus, the agency abused its discretion
in approving the plans.43 7 In reaching its result, the court
imported from CEQA the duty of a public agency to consider the
cumulative environmental effects of a proposed project, even
though it determined that CEQA was not expressly applicable.
The court overturned a public agency's declaration that a
project was exempt from CEQA in McQueen v. Board of
Directors.43' A local agency sought to acquire surplus federal
property on which there were electrical transformers filled with a
toxic contaminant. Describing the project as a purchase of property
for open space purposes with no plans for development, the agency
claimed an exemption from the requirements of CEQA. The court
of appeal ruled that the project was not the mere acquisition of the
property, but necessarily included the storage, use and potential
disposal of toxic contaminants on the property.439 The court
433. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 4511-4628 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
434. 14 CAL. CODE REGS. §§ 911-928.8 (1990).
435. Laupheimer, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 458, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91.
436. Id at 460-62, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 91-93.
437. Id at 466, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
438. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 249 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1988).
439. Id at 1147, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
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explained that the agency, upon purchasing the property, would
have to satisfy federal and state regulations which imposed
stringent requirements on the storage and handling of the
contaminant at issue.' 0 Once the project was described properly,
the court concluded that no CEQA exemption applied to the
project." '1 Although the agency already had completed its
acquisition of the property and had adopted a use plan, the court of
appeal directed the trial court to issue a writ of mandate to compel
the agency to conduct a proper environmental review before
implementing its use plan. 2 The result was correct in view of
the Sixth District's proper analysis of CEQA.
C. There Were No Discernible Trends in the Sixth District's
Environmental or Land Use Cases Which Did Not Involve
CEQA Issues
The Sixth District decided three cases which presented
environmental or land use issues outside the realm of CEQA. The
court set aside a public agency's action in two of those cases and
upheld it in the other case.
In Western Oil & Gas Association v. Monterey Bay Unified Air
Pollution Control District,"3 the court held that the Tanner
Act,4 " which specifies procedures by which the state Air
Resources Board may identify and control toxic air contaminants,
preempts a local air pollution control district from adopting a
regulation by which it may identify toxic air contaminants.4' The
court was impressed by the statutory procedures, by which the state
board must identify sources of air pollution; the procedures were
highly detailed, so as to indicate an intention by the legislature that
the state has occupied fully the area of identification of toxic air
440. Id. at 1145-47, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
441. IaL at 1149, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
442. Id at 1152-53, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49.
443. 202 Cal. App. 3d 511, 248 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1988), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d 408, 777 P.2d 157,
261 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1989) (superseded by supreme court's grant of review).
444. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39650-39675 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
445. Western Oi/, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 513, 518, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 41923.
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contaminants." Pointing to the statutory goal that toxic air
contaminants be identified through the best available scientific
evidence, the court reasoned that the state could achieve that goal
only through the utilization of the statutory procedures.447
The supreme court reversed the Sixth District's decision in
Western Oil."s Finding that local districts had the power to
identify sources of air pollution before the Tanner Act was passed,
the supreme court stated that the issue was not preemption, but
whether the legislature had impliedly repealed that power of the
local districts." 9 The court held that the Tanner Act neither
expressly nor impliedly repealed the authority of local districts to
identify toxic air contaminants. 4 0 Addressing the issue of
preemption, the supreme court decided that the legislature did not
intend to preempt local districts from identifying sources of air
pollution before the state board has done so.451 The court
emphasized that the complexity of the statutory procedures which
the state board must employ is insufficient to establish preemption.
Given the significant legislative goal to protect public health, the
court concluded that the legislature must have intended that local
districts could identify and control toxic air contaminants in the
interim, before the state board has completed its lengthy and
complex procedures with respect to any particular contaminant.
45 2
Thus, the supreme court rejected the Sixth District's preemption
analysis, while reversing the court on an independent ground.
In Orsi v. City Council,4 3 the court strictly applied the
provisions of the Permit Streamlining Acte54 so as to compel a
city to issue a permit to the plaintiffs. The Act requires a public
agency to notify an applicant that a permit application is
446. Id at 520-21, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 423-24.
447. Id at 521, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 424-25.
448. Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 49 Cal.
3d 408, 429, 777 P.2d 157, 170, 261 Cal. Rptr. 384, 397 (1989).
449. Id at 417, 777 P.2d at 162, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
450. Id at 419, 777 P.2d at 163, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
451. Id at 423-24, 777 P.2d at 166-67, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94.
452. Id
453. 219 Cal. App. 3d 1576, 268 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1990).
454. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65920-65963.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
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incomplete within thirty days of receipt of the incomplete
application.455 If no EIR is required, the public agency then must
issue a decision on the requested approval within six months of the
date on which the application was complete.456 In Orsi, the city
notified the plaintiffs that their permit application was inadequate
forty-one days after the city had received the application. In
cooperation with the city, the plaintiffs resubmitted a completed
application three months after their original application.457 The
city denied the permit application nine months after the original
application was filed, but within six months of the resubmitted
application. 45
8
The court of appeal determined in Orsi that the city's tardy
notification of the incompleteness of the application was
ineffective; thus, the application was deemed complete thirty days
after it was filed, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' resubmittal of a
completed application.45 9 The court also found that the city issued
a negative declaration for the proposed project and failed to grant
or deny the permit within six months of the date on which the
application was deemed complete.4 ° Consequently, the court held
that the plaintiffs' permit application was granted by operation of
law and the city's denial of the permit was a nullity.46' Given
that it ruled against the city and reversed the judgment of the trial
court, the Sixth District gave notice that it would enforce the
mandatory provisions of the Permit Streamlining Act.
In Getz v. Pebble Beach Community Services District,462 the
court upheld the public agency's denial of a sewer permit to the
owners of a qualified senior citizen housing unit. The local land
use plan prohibited the allocation of sewer hookups to senior
citizen housing units, as a result of insufficient sewer capacity. The
court of appeal concluded that the state policy to provide housing
455. Id § 65943 (West Supp. 1991).
456. Id, § 65950.
457. Orsi, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 1580, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
458. IX.
459. Id at 1584-86, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 916-18.
460. Id at 1586-87, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 918-19.
461. Id at 1587-88, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
462. 219 Cal. App. 3d 229, 268 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1990).
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for senior citizens was outweighed, in this case, by the conflicting




The Sixth District's only significant real property decisions
involved landlord-tenant issues. There were no discernible trends
in those decisions. Out of four landlord-tenant cases, the court
decided two in favor of the tenant and the other two in favor of the
landlord.
A. Decisions Which Favored Tenants
The court's most significant landlord-tenant decision was in
Carma Developers (California), Inc. v. Marathon Development
California, Inc.4' The Sixth District held that a commercial lease
provision, which granted the lessor the right to terminate the lease
upon the tenant's mere request for the lessor's consent to a
sublease, was void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation of the
tenant's interest in the lease.4 ' The court likewise ruled that the
lessor had violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing when the lessor terminated the ten-year lease -- shortly
after the tenant located a subtenant and requested the lessor's
permission to sublet -- solely to obtain the increase in the rental
value of the leased premises.4 ' Thus, the court effectively
voided, as against public policy, a "recapture" provision in the
commercial lease that enabled the lessor to cancel a lease in order
to reap the additional rent which the subtenant was willing to pay
over and above the contract rent in the lease between the lessor and
463. Id at 233, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
464. 224 Cal. App. 3d 414,259 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1989), review granted and opinion superseded,
783 P.2d 183, 264 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1989). Prior to the grant of review, all seven Supreme Court
justices recused themselves and the case was transferred to the Third District Court of Appeal for
decision by a randomly drawn seven-justice panel. See Carma Developers (California), Inc. v.
Marathon Development California, Inc., 779 P.2d 292, 262 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1989).
465. Id at 418, 421, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 910, 912.
466. Id at 421-22, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
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the tenant. In arriving at those conclusions, the court properly
applied the principles laid down by the supreme court in Kendall
v. Ernest Pestana, Inc.
467
All members of the California Supreme Court recused
themselves in Carma because the court leased space in a building
owned by Marathon. The court transferred the matter to the Third
District Court of Appeal in Sacramento for decision by a seven-
justice panel, sitting as the supreme court. The surrogate supreme
court granted review, but has not yet issued a decision on the
merits in Carma.
In 1989, the same year in which Carina was decided, the
legislature entered the fray by adding new provisions to the Civil
Code regarding assignments and subleases.468  Civil Code
section 1995.230 provides that a lease may prohibit absolutely a
tenant's transfer of his or her interest in the lease.469 Also, under
Civil Code section 1995.240, a lease may provide that the lessor is
entitled to some or all of any consideration which the tenant
becomes eligible to receive from a sublease or assignment in
excess of the rent specified in the lease.47 Although the new
statutory provisions took effect on January 1, 1990, the legislature
expressly stated that they would have retroactive effect.47
The Sixth District's ruling in Carma very well could survive
the recent legislation and supreme court review. The new statutes
do not undermine the Sixth District's decision. For example, the
new legislation does not address recapture clauses, such as the one
which the court found objectionable in Carma. Also, the Carma
lease did not contain a provision which prohibited any transfer of
the tenant's interest in the lease nor a provision which expressly
allowed the lessor to obtain the bonus rent from a sublease.
Moreover, the Sixth District's Carma decision was entirely
467. 40 Cal. 3d 488,500-01,506-07, 709 P.2d 837, 844-45, 849,220 Cal. Rptr. 818, 825-26,
830 (1985).
468. See, e.g., CA.. CIV. CODE §§ 1995.010-1995.270 (West Supp. 1991).
469. Id § 1995.230 (West Supp. 1991).
470. Id § 1995.240.
471. Id § 1995.030.
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consistent with Kendall. The surrogate supreme court probably
would not consider overruling Kendall.
In Dover Mobile Estates v. Fiber Form Products, Inc.,472 the
court of appeal determined that a tenant was not liable to the
lessor's successor-in-interest, who had acquired the leased property
at a foreclosure sale, following the tenant's termination of the lease
upon thirty days notice.' 7 The court merely reaffirmed the rule
that a foreclosure sale under a deed of trust extinguishes a junior
lease.474 Applying that rule, the court correctly decided that the
foreclosure sale resulted in the creation of a month-to-month
tenancy, which the tenant lawfully could terminate after giving
thirty days notice.4"
B. Decisions Which Favored Landlords
In Pay N Pak Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court,476 the Sixth
District reached a questionable result in ruling for a lessor. The
tenants operated a small store in a shopping center under a ten year
lease which required the lessor's consent to a sublease. Pay 'N Pak,
which operated a large home improvement store in the same
shopping center, assumed the original lessor's interest in the
lease.477 When the tenants tried to sublease their store, Pay 'N
Pak refused to consent to two potential subtenants because both
parties purportedly planned to operate a business in competition
with Pay 'N Pak.478 One prospective subtenant intended to sell
fireplace equipment and the other would sell ceiling fans and
lighting fixtures.479 After Pay 'N Pak finally gave permission to
another subtenant, the tenants sued Pay 'N Pak for, among other
things, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
472. 220 Cal. App. 3d 1494, 270 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1990).
473. Id. at 1501, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
474. Id at 1499-1500, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
475. Id at 1501, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
476. 210 Cal. App. 3d 1404, 258 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1989).
477. Id at 1406-07, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
478. Id at 1407, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
479. Id
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dealing.48 In support of their summary judgment motion, the
plaintiffs presented evidence which showed that, over a one-year
period, Pay 'N Pak sold only $23,000 worth of fireplace equipment
and $39,000 worth of fans and lighting fixtures out of over
$4,000,000 of sales at the store in the shopping center.4" Pay 'N
Pak claimed that the fireplace equipment, fans and lighting fixtures
were important product lines for the store. The trial court granted
the plaintiffs' motion, ruling that the issue of the unreasonableness
of Pay 'N Pak's refusal to consent to the two potential subtenants
was without substantial controversy.
482
In Pay 'N Pak, the Sixth District issued a writ of mandate
which directed the trial court to set aside that order.483 The court
of appeal stated that the evidence revealed issues of fact regarding
the reasonableness of Pay 'N Pak's withholding of consent.
484
The court also concluded that protection from business competition
is a commercially reasonable objection of a lessor to a proposed
subtenant. 485
The court's legal principle in Pay 'N Pak may be correct in that
a lessor should be entitled to ward off competition, in a proper
case, by withholding consent to a prospective subtenant. However,
Pay 'N Pak did not realistically present that situation. Each of the
two rejected subtenants sold goods which constituted less than one
percent of the volume of sales at the Pay 'N Pak store in the
shopping center. Thus, any competition would be de minimis.
Naturally, Pay 'N Pak resisted the plaintiffs' summary judgment
motion with claims that the types of goods at issue were important
and drew customers into the store. The trial court properly ruled
that no material issue of fact existed and that Pay 'N Pak's refusal
to consent to the two subtenants was unreasonable.
480. 1d.
481. id. at 1408, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
482. Id
483. Id at 1412, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
484. d at 1408-09, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
485. Id at 1410-11, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20.
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Zanker Development Co. v. Cogito Systems, Inc.486 concerned
a tenant's claim that a lessor had failed to mitigate its damages
following the eviction of the tenant. After it obtained a judgment
of unlawful detainer, the lessor made substantial efforts to locate
a new tenant for the leased premises and eventually found a new
tenant. The lessor also rejected the defaulting tenant's offer to
remain in possession and to pay full rent under the lease until the
lessor asked the tenant to leave. The court of appeal held that the
lessor had no duty to negotiate a new lease with the evicted tenant
in order to mitigate damages, even if the tenant offered terms
which could have avoided a loss to the lessor.487 The court's
rationale was that the reasonableness of the actions which the
plaintiff took - not the reasonableness of the actions which the
plaintiff could have taken - is the focus of the inquiry regarding the
issue of a plaintiff's mitigation of damages.488 The court decided
that the lessor had mitigated its damages because the lessor acted
reasonably in its successful efforts to find a new tenant.489
Although the tenant's proposal may have seemed reasonable, the
court's decision and analysis seem proper.
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
A. The Sixth District Tended to Protect Freedom of the Press in
Libel Cases
In three decisions, the Sixth District addressed the tension
between the constitutional right of freedom of the press and an
individual's right to be free from defamation. In two of those cases,
the court ruled for the press, based upon constitutional standards.
In the other case, the court found for the individual, based upon a
statute.
486. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1377, 264 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1989).
487. Id at 1382, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
488. Id at 1381, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
489. Id at 1382-83, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
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In Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury News,490 a former city
councilman sued the newspaper as a result of a series of articles
which alleged that he had a conflict of interest regarding the city's
award of a government contract. He also sued the reporter for
slander because the reporter had called him a "crook" and a
"crooked politician" during an interview with a third party. The
trial court granted a motion for nonsuit as to the slander claim, but
awarded over $1,000,000 in damages, including punitive damages,
on the libel claim.49'
The court of appeal reversed the judgment on the libel cause of
action. Finding that the plaintiff was a public figure, the court
applied the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan492 standard, under
which a plaintiff must prove with clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant published the defamatory statement with "actual
malice," that is, with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
the falsity of the statement.493 The court explained that that
standard is not objective; instead, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant had actual doubt regarding the truth of the published
statement.49 Upon a review of the evidence which purportedly
demonstrated that the reporter and the newspaper were hostile to
the plaintiff and lacked objectivity in the published articles, the
Sixth District concluded that the plaintiff's evidence of actual
malice was "neither clear nor convincing. 4 95 The court also
affirmed the judgment on the slander claim, finding that the
reporter's remarks constituted opinions, rather than actionable
factual statements.49 The result and reasoning in the court's
opinion were sound, even though the newspaper articles contained
factual errors.
Carney v. Santa Cruz Women Against Rape49" involved a libel
action by a plaintiff who was not a public figure. In a periodic
490. 216 Cal. App. 3d 172, 264 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 51 (1990).
491. Id. at 177, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
492. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
493. Fletcher, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 184, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
494. Id,
495. Id at 189-90, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
496. Id. at 190-91, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
497. 221 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 271 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1990).
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newsletter which was distributed in public places throughout a city,
the defendant charged that the plaintiff had committed an assault
and attempted rape on a woman (Karen) in the community. The
newsletter provided the plaintiff's physical description, address and
place of employment. The defendant based its accusation on
Karen's account of the disputed incident and did not contact the
plaintiff before publication. Denying the published charges, the
plaintiff brought an action for libel, among other things, against the
newsletter publisher and Karen.49 Under the terms of a
settlement with Karen, he exchanged letters of apology with Karen.
Her letter stated that the plaintiff never raped her and never had
any sexual relations with her. After a trial, the jury awarded the
plaintiff $7,500 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive
damages.499
In Carney, the court of appeal reversed because the jury
instructions contained prejudicial errors of law. First, the trial
court's instruction on the standard of proof was erroneous.5"
Although the plaintiff was a private figure, the trial court gave an
"actual malice" instruction.5"' The court of appeal emphasized
that the defendant's negligence, not malice, was the standard; the
plaintiff had the burden of proving that the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care in confirming the accuracy of the
information published in the newsletter.5" The plaintiff argued
that the error was not prejudicial because the actual malice
instruction contained a higher standard of proof than a negligence
instruction."0 3 The court rejected that argument, reasoning that the
absence of a negligence instruction allowed the jury to impose
liability without fault and without considering whether the plaintiff
had carried his burden of proof on the salient issue of the
defendant's negligence.
498. id. at 1013-14, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
499. Id. at 1015, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
500. Ild.
501. Id at 1016, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
502. 1& at 1016, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
503. 1& at 1017, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
504. Id.
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Second, the trial court's failure to give an actual malice
instruction on the issue of punitive damages in Carney also was
erroneous. When a publication relates to a matter of public
concern, the court explained, even a private-figure plaintiff must
prove actual malice in order to recover punitive damages.0 5 In
this regard, the court noted that the test is whether the entire
publication -- not just the defamatory statement or article -- treated
matters of public concern. 6 Using that test, the court decided
that the newsletter did address matters of public importance and
therefore, the award of punitive damages was improper.0 7
On two significant evidentiary issues in Carney, the court ruled
that Karen's letter of apology was admissible to prove the
plaintiff's case against the publisher because Evidence Code
section 1152(a) bars the admission of a settlement letter to
demonstrate the liability of only the settling party5°8 -- in this
case, Karen.5" Also, the court determined that, upon retrial, the
defendant could present evidence that Karen had experienced rape
trauma syndrome on the issue of the import of Karen's letter of
apology to the plaintiff, but not to prove that an attempted rape had
occurred or that the defendant believed that a sexual assault had
occurred.5 10
In Carney, the Sixth District's rulings on the jury instructions
faithfully followed the supreme court's recent decision in Brown v.
Kelly Broadcasting Co.5" The court also provided a proper
reading of Evidence Code section 1152(a). Finally, the court's
rulings on the admissibility of the rape trauma syndrome evidence
were correct, in view of the supreme court's decision in People v.
Bledsoe, 12 which held that such evidence is inadmissible to
505. Id at 1019, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36.
506. Id at 1021, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
507. Id at 1022, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
508. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152(a) (West Supp. 1991).
509. Carney, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1023-24, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39.
510. Id. at 1025-26, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40.
511. 48 Cal. 3d 711, 747, 771 P.2d 406, 435, 257 Cal. Rplr. 708, 730-31 (1989) (concluding
that constitutional rules of liability in defamation actions require private-figure plaintiff to prove
negligence to recover compensatory damages and actual malice to recover punitive damages).
512. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 238, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 460 (1984).
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establish that a rape had taken place. Evidence of rape trauma
syndrome is admissible for other purposes, as the Sixth District
decided in Carney.
In Pierce v. San Jose Mercury News, 13 the court faced the
issue of the validity of the newspaper's retraction of a defamatory
statement. In a front-page article, the newspaper falsely reported
that a police officer had been disciplined for misconduct." 4
Nearly a month later, on Christmas day, the newspaper printed a
retraction of the story, as to that police officer, on page two. 515
The police officer sued for libel, but the trial court granted the
newspaper's motion for summary judgment, based upon the
findings that the retraction was proper and that the plaintiff failed
to prove special damages.516
The Sixth District held that the question of the newspaper's
compliance with the requirements of Civil Code section 48a, which
governs retractions of defamatory statements,5 " was an issue of
fact which a jury should decide.518 In reaching that conclusion,
the court expressly refused to follow out-of-state cases which ruled
that the sufficiency of a retraction is an issue of law.519 The
court's ruling on the statute was dispositive in Pierce because, as
the court found, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the
retraction was published in a "substantially as conspicuous a
manner" as the original article.52 °
513. 214 Cal. App. 3d 1626, 263 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1989).
514. Id at 1628-29, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
515. Id at 1629-30, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
516. Id at 1630, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13.
517. Section 48a exempts the press from liability for all damages, other than "special
damages,- if the defendant publishes a correction of the allegedly defamatory statement "in
substantially as conspicuous a manner in said newspaper ... as the statements claimed in the
complaint to be libelous .... " CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1982).
518. Pierce, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 1631, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
519. Id at 1632-33, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15.
520. Id at 1633, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
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B. The Sixth District Upheld the Right to Privacy in a Major Drug
Testing Case
The constitutionality of mandatory drug testing is currently an
issue of critical importance to the public. Finding that neither an
absolute authorization nor a total prohibition of drug testing is
appropriate, the courts have proceeded cautiously in balancing the
competing interests at stake. Within the last three years, the Sixth
District offered its first contribution to this area of law.
In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,521 two
Stanford University athletes brought an injunction action to enjoin
their required participation in the NCAA's drug testing program for
athletes. The Sixth District held that the National Collegiate
Athletic Association's (NCAA) mandatory drug testing program
violated the athletes' right to privacy under the California
Constitution.5"
Consistent with the conclusion of other courts, the Sixth District
first determined, in Hill, that the privacy clause in the California
Constitution523 applied to actions by a private entity, such as the
NCAA. 524 Next, the court announced that the compelling interest
test would apply. Under that test, the NCAA's program would
violate an athlete's constitutional right to privacy, unless the NCAA
showed that: (1) the drug testing program had some relation to the
objectives of the NCAA regulations which confer the benefit of
participation in intercollegiate athletics; (2) the utility of the
program manifestly outweighed the impairment of the right to
privacy; and (3) there were no less restrictive means to accomplish
the purposes of the program."z Following a comprehensive
review of the evidence, the court summarized its conclusions as
follows:
521. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1642, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1990), review granted and opinion
superseded, 801 P.2d 1070, 276 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1990).
522. Id. at 1647, 1675, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05, 422.
523. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
524. Hill, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1652, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
525. Id. at 1656-57, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11.
1140
1991 / Court Of Appeal For The Sixth Appellate District
From the evidence it is clear that the... test has not been
satisfied. First, the evidence did not support the NCAA's
claim that there is significant drug use among student
athletes, and that by testing, students' health and safety and
the integrity of the competition will be protected. The
evidence showed that the test program was too broad, and
its accuracy doubtful. The appeal procedure was inadequate.
Finally, there are alternatives to testing that are less
offensive to the right of privacy which have not been
adequately considered. Therefore, what usefulness the
program had did not manifestly outweigh the resulting
impairment of the constitutional right of privacy. For these
reasons, the NCAA may not require student athletes to
"waive" their constitutional rights in order to receive the
benefit of participation in intercollegiate athletics.526
Thus, the court concluded that the NCAA had not satisfied any of
the three elements of the compelling interest test.
In Hill, the Sixth District applied the correct test and reached
the proper result based upon an exhaustive analysis of the evidence.
Surprisingly, the supreme court granted review in Hill,527 in spite
of its unique facts. Although Hill certainly presented a significant
legal issue, it seems that the supreme court should review a drug
testing case which would have more widespread ramifications, such
as a case involving an employer's mandatory drug testing program.
In Hill, the supreme court certainly should not provide judicial
benediction to all mandatory drug testing programs.
C. The Sixth District Was Skeptical of Claims of Religious
Freedom in Two Cases
The Sixth District decided two cases involving claims of
protection under the constitutional guaranty of freedom of religious
expression. In both cases, the court declined an invitation to use the
526. Id. at 1675, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
527. 801 P.2d 1070, 276 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1990).
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constitutional right as an impenetrable shield against state
authorized sanctions.
In Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church,52 the plaintiffs,
a bishop and another church member, confessed that they were
having an extramarital sexual affair to church officials, who
promised to maintain the confidentiality of the confession. The
church officials disclosed the confession to numerous other church
officials and to an assembled congregation. The plaintiffs sued the
church under numerous tort theories. The trial court dismissed most
of these claims for lack of jurisdiction, finding that they presented
ecclesiastical questions. 29
In Snyder, the court of appeal reversed the dismissal. The court
stated that the trial court initially had to determine whether the
church was a religion and whether the disclosure of the confidential
confessions qualified as religious expression.53 A positive answer
to both questions would require the court to ask next whether the
state's interest in deterring the harm, which the religious expression
allegedly caused, outweighed the need to protect the religious
expression. 3' According to the court, the balancing of these two
interests would involve a four-part inquiry: (1) The government
interest must be compelling; (2) the burden on expression must be
necessary to promote the government interest; (3) the burden must
be the least restrictive means to accomplish the government
objective; and (4) the burden may not discriminate against any
particular religion.532 Applying the test, the court of appeal
concluded that the church was a religion, but found that the record
did not show whether the church officials disclosed the confessions
pursuant to a church doctrine.-3 3 Therefore, the court could not
determine whether the challenged conduct constituted religious
expression. The court's disposition was a remand to the trial court
528. 216 Cal. App. 3d 297, 264 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1989).
529. Id at 301, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
530. Id. at 306, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id at 307, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
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to resolve the issues which the lower court had not addressed.3
Specifically, if it determined that the disclosure of the confessions
was religious expression, the trial court would have to apply the
four-part compelling interest test.
535
Although the result was a remand, the Sixth District's opinion
left little doubt that the court viewed the conduct of the church
officials as actionable. The court relied heavily on two recent cases
which held religious organizations liable for tortious conduct in the
face of a claim of constitutional protection. 536 In Snyder, the
Sixth District emphasized that the state has an important interest in
discouraging wrongful conduct of a church that inflicts injury upon
a church member, even if the conduct amounts to religious
expression.
In Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Andrews,537 several
individuals died or suffered severe injury by following the fasting
practices prescribed by the defendant, who was the president and
first minister of a certain religion. The board obtained an injunction
which enjoined the defendant from the unauthorized practice of
medicine without a license.538  On appeal, the defendant
contended that his conduct was protected by the constitutional
guaranty of the right to freedom of expression.539 The defendant
also argued that he was exempt from the requirement to obtain a
license to practice medicine under Business and Professions Code
section 2063.54
In affirming the judgment, the court of appeal vigorously
rejected both arguments in Andrews. Finding that the defendant's
fasting treatments unquestionably constituted the practice of
534. Id. at 310, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
535. Id.
536. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1117-18,762 P.2d 46,59-60,252 Cal. Rptr.
122, 135-36 (1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 212
Cal. App. 3d 872, 897, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331, 347 (1989).
537. 211 Cal. App. 3d 1346,260 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1989).
538. Id. at 1353,260 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
539. Id, at 1348, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
540. Id Section 2063 provides, in pertinent part: "'Nothing in this chapter [the Medical Practice
Act] shall be construed so as to... interfere in any way with the practice of religion." CA. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 2063 (West 1990).
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medicine, the court concluded that the state had a sufficiently
compelling interest in the protection of public safety so as to allow
the state to prohibit the defendant's dangerous practices, even if
those practices constituted religious expression.541 The court
likewise decided that the section 2063 exemption did not apply
because the statute did not afford any greater rights than the
protection afforded by the federal and state constitutions.542
On the subject of the applicability of the statutory exemption,
the Sixth District, in Andrews, severely condemned the decision of
the Third District Court of Appeal in Northrup v. Superior
Court.543 In Northrup, the court applied the exemption to
preclude the criminal prosecution of members of an established
religion for practicing midwifery without a license.544 In
Andrews, the defendant sought to rely on Northrup, but the Sixth
District rejected the reasoning in that case. The Andrews court
refused to believe that the legislature could have intended section
2063 to permit dangerous medical practices.545 The court further
criticized Northrup's implicit conclusion that the section 2063
exemption provides a member of a religious organization with
more protection than the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.5 4
6
The Sixth District's criticism of Northrup was justified. In
Northrup, the Third District narrowly limited its holding; the court
stated that its interpretation of the section 2063 exemption
prohibited only a criminal prosecution for the failure to practice
medicine without a license.547 In other words, the state could
prosecute the church members who practiced midwifery for any
wrongful and dangerous acts which they performed.548 Moreover,
the court expressly distinguished the situation before it from "cases
541. Andrews, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1353-54, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 118-19.
542. Id at 1356-57, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 120-21.
543. 192 Cal. App. 3d 276, 237 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1987).
544. Id. at 282, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 258-59.
545. Andrews, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1355-56, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 119-20.
546. Id at 1355-57, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 119-20.
547. Northrup, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 283-84, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60.
548. Id at 283, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
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involving the clash between religious beliefs concerning medical
treatment and the state's interest in protecting its citizens.
549
Thus, the Third District essentially distinguished the situation in
Northrup from the scenario in Andrews. However, the effect of
Northrup is that unlicensed individuals can continue to practice
medicine and injure innocent victims. While Northrup allows these
individuals to be sued or prosecuted after they inflict injury, the
state is helpless in attempting to achieve the paramount goal of
protection of public health. If presented with the choice, courts
should follow Andrews rather than Northrup.
IX. THE COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF PROCEDURAL STATUTES
In 1985-1987, the Sixth District did not hesitate to apply a
statute of repose so as to bar a plaintiff's untimely claim. In 1988-
1990, the court usually followed that pattern. Apart from
government tort claims statutes, the court had occasion to construe
the dismissal statutes in the Code of Civil Procedure in seven
cases. Four of these cases involved the five-year rule, under which
an action must be dismissed if not brought to trial within five years
of the filing of the lawsuit, and three cases involved the three-year
rule, whereby an action must be dismissed if the summons and
complaint are not served within three years of the filing of the
complaint. In five out of the seven cases concerning the dismissal
rules, the Sixth District sustained a dismissal of the plaintiff's
action.
A. The Sixth District Generally Applied the Five-Year Dismissal
Rule to Bar a Plaintiff's Action
Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 mandates that a
plaintiff bring his or her action to trial within five years of the
filing of the complaint.5"' Code of Civil Procedure
section 583.360 provides that a trial court shall dismiss the action,
549. Id. at 284 n.7, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 260 n.7.
550. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.310 (West Supp. 1991).
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if the plaintiff has not timely brought his or her action to trial. 51
In three out of four cases in which the Sixth District applied the
five-year dismissal rule, the court affinned a dismissal.
In two cases, the Sixth District announced its position with
respect to a split in authorities on the issue of a plaintiff's duty to
obtain a trial date within the five-year period following a court-
ordered, nonbinding arbitration.
In Moran v. Superior Court,552 the supreme court held that
the five-year period in former Code of Civil Procedure
section 583(b) (now sections 583.310 and 583.360) is tolled, once
a party files a request for a trial de novo after arbitration.553 The
court explained that tolling of the five-year dismissal period was
necessary because the trial court has a duty, under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1141.20,.. to recalendar the trial in the same
place which it had on the active list before arbitration and a
plaintiff has the right to rely upon the court's performance of that
duty. 555
Some courts have construed the Moran rule literally to mean
that a plaintiff, upon filing a request for a trial de novo after
arbitration within the five-year period, does not need to take any
further steps to avoid dismissal; other courts conclude that,
notwithstanding the Moran rule, a plaintiff must exercise
reasonable diligence in attempting to secure a trial date within the
five-year period following arbitration.556
The Sixth District opted for the rule which mandates that a
party use reasonable diligence in seeking a trial date after
551. Id. § 583.360.
552. 35 Cal. 3d 229, 673 P.2d 216, 197 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1983).
553. Id. at 241-42, 673 P.2d at 223-24, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55.
554. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1141.20 (West Supp. 1991). California Code of Civil
Procedure section 1141.11 requires all superior court actions which are at-issue and which involve
less than $50,000 in damages to be referred to non-binding arbitration. Id. § 1141.11.
Section 1141.20 authorizes a party to file a request for a trial de novo in the superior court after the
arbitrator has made his or her award. Id. § 1141.20.
555. Moran, 35 Cal. 3d at 242, 673 P.2d at 224, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
556. See, e.g., Baccus v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1526, 1535,255 Cal. Rptr. 781,786
(1989), and cases cited therein; Santa Monica Hosp. Medical Center v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App.
3d 1026, 1031-33, 250 Cal. Rptr. 384, 386-87 (1988), and cases cited therein.
1146
1991 / Court Of Appeal For The Sixth Appellate District
arbitration. In Serrano v. FMC Corp.,557 the plaintiff filed his
action on December 14, 1983. Following an unsuccessful
arbitration, the plaintiff requested a trial de novo on December 23,
1986. He took no further action until November 1988. When a
clerk advised him to file a new at-issue memorandum, he did so on
December 22, 1988, without mentioning that the five-year period
was about to expire. After the five-year period passed, the trial
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss." The court of
appeal affirmed. Pointing out the conflict in authority, the court
ruled that the plaintiff was required to exercise reasonable diligence
after the arbitration to secure a trial date within the five-year
period."' The court held that the plaintiff unreasonably ignored
the running of the five-year period in the dismissal statute.5 ° The
Sixth District reached the same result in Dresser v. Bindi.56'
In Schwenke v. J & P Scott, Inc.,562 the court again affirmed
a dismissal under the five-year rule. The plaintiff brought an action
in municipal court and the defendant filed an unverified cross-
complaint seeking damages in excess of the jurisdictional limit of
the municipal court.563 The case was transferred to the superior
court eight and one-half months after the defendant filed the cross-
complaint." Eventually, the superior court dismissed the
plaintiff's action five years and six months after he had
commenced the action in the 'municipal court.5" On appeal, the
plaintiff contended that dismissal was improper because the eight
and one-half month period between the filing of the cross-
complaint and the transfer of the case to the superior court should
557. 221 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 271 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1990).
558. Id. at 1029, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
559. L at 1031-32, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
560. Id at 1032, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44.
561. 221 Cal. App. 3d 1493, 1497-1500, 271 Cal. Rptr. 137, 139-41 (1990).
562. 205 Cal. App. 3d 71, 252 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1988).
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have been excluded in that the jurisdiction of the courts was
suspended during that period.5"
In Schwenke, the court of appeal disagreed, based upon its
construction of the transfer statute, Code of Civil Procedure
section 396.567 Section 396 provides that a court, which discovers
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction from verified pleadings or
at trial or at a hearing, must suspend all proceedings and transfer
the case to a court with jurisdiction.561 Observing that the
defendant had filed an unverified cross-complaint, the court decided
that the jurisdiction of the municipal court was not suspended
under section 396 upon the mere filing of the cross-complaint
because the municipal court, at that time, did not and could not
determine that it lacked jurisdiction based upon admissible
evidence.5 69 The municipal court first became aware that it lacked
jurisdiction at the hearing on the defendant's motion to
transfer.570 The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal because the
five-year period had run.571' The moral of the case is that a
plaintiff in Schwenke's position should file a motion to transfer the
case immediately upon receiving a cross-complaint which would
deprive the municipal court of jurisdiction.
In Schiro v. Curci,572 the court held that the plaintiff's action
was not barred by the five-year dismissal rule. After the parties
reached a settlement of their cross-actions, the plaintiff refused to
perform his obligations under the settlement agreement. The
defendant brought a motion for a judgment on the settlement
agreement, under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6,57' and
the plaintiff responded with a dismissal motion under the five-year
566. Id at 75,252 Cal Rptr. at 92. California Code of Civil Procedure section 583.340(a) tolls
tlhe running of the five-year period in the dismissal statute for any period of time during which the
jurisdiction of the court was suspended. CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 583.340(a) (West Supp. 1991).
567. Schwenke, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 75-79,252 Cal. Rptr. at 93-95. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 396 (West Supp. 1991) (transfer statute).
568. Id CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 396 (West 1991).
569. Schwenke, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 78-79, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
570. Id at 78, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
571. Id at 80, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
572. 220 Cal. App. 3d 840, 269 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1990).
573. Id at 842, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 640. See CAL Civ. PRoc. CODE § 664.6 (West 1987)
(authorizing a trial court to enter a judgment pursuant to the terms of a settlement agreement).
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rule.57 4 The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in
favor of the defendant.575 The court pointed out the disagreement
in appellate decisions in cases involving a conflict between
section 664.6 and the five-year dismissal rule. Some courts hold
that dismissal under the five-year rule cannot be entered after the
parties execute a settlement agreement because the settlement
necessarily precludes a trial and renders the dismissal statute
irrelevant;576 other courts conclude that the action can be
dismissed under the dismissal statute, if no judgment has been
entered on the settlement agreement and the case has not been
brought to trial within the five-year period. 77 The Sixth District
chose to apply the former rule, based primarily on the policy which
favors settlements."' The court also reasoned that it would have
been futile for the parties to bring the action to trial after they
executed the settlement agreement and thus, the factual situation fit
within the futility exception to the five-year dismissal statute.579
B. The Sixth District Also Enforced the Three-Year Dismissal Rule
Against Plaintiffs
Code of Civil Procedure section 583.210(a) directs a plaintiff
to serve the summons and complaint on the defendant within three
years of the filing of the complaint.5"' Code of Civil Procedure
section 583.250 provides that a court shall dismiss the action, if the
plaintiff has not timely served the summons and complaint.58 ' In
three cases involving the three-year dismissal statute, the Sixth
District ordered a dismissal in two cases, but found a dismissal
improper in the third case.
574. Schiro, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 842, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
575. Id at 841-42, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
576. Id at 843-44,269 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41; Gormnan v. Holte, 164 Cal. App. 3d 984,986,211
Cal. Rptr. 34, 35 (1985).
577. Id See Varwig v. Leider, 171 Cal. App. 3d 312, 217 Cal. Rptr. 2086 (1985).
578. Schiro, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 844, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
579. Id at 844-45,269 Cal. Rptr. at 641. See CAL. Cv. PROC. CODE § 583.340(c) (West Supp.
1991) (futility exception).
580. CAt. Cv. PRoc. CODE § 583.210(a) (West Supp. 1991).
581. Id § 583.250.
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In Sanchez v. Superior Court,582 two separate actions were
brought on behalf of different plaintiffs arising out of the same
fatal traffic accident. The defendants and their attorneys were the
same in both actions. The two actions were consolidated for trial
and the parties proceeded to take discovery, including depositions.
The complaint in one of the actions was not served upon the
defendants. The defendants brought a motion to dismiss that action
under the three-year rule.583 The trial court denied the motion,
finding that the participation of the defendants' attorneys at
depositions in the consolidated action constituted a general
appearance which rendered unnecessary actual service of the
complaint in the one action."' The trial judge commented that
the defendants' attorneys, by seeking a dismissal under the
circumstances, had engaged in "sharp practice." 585
The court of appeal issued a writ of mandate in Sanchez,
directing the trial court to dismiss the action in which the
defendants had not been served with the complaint.586 The court
explained that the two lawsuits remained separate, even after
consolidation for trial, and the participation of the defendants'
attorneys in the action in which the defendants had been served did
not constitute a general appearance in the other action.587 The
court further refused to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the
defendants because they had engaged in no affirmative conduct and
did not have a duty to advise the plaintiffs in the one action that
they had not been served with the complaint. 58 Ultimately, the
court found the defendants' attorneys innocent of "sharp
practice.9
In Tzolov v. International Jet Leasing, Inc.,5  the court
affirmed a judgment of dismissal under the three-year statute. The
582. 203 Cal. App. 3d 1391, 250 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1988).
583. Id at 1394-95, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 788-89.
584. Id at 1395, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
585. Id
586. d at 1394, 1401, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 788, 792-93.
587. Id at 1399, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
588. Id at 1399-1400, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 791-92.
589. Id at 1400, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
590. 214 Cal. App. 3d 325, 262 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1989).
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plaintiff suffered a severe head injury when he fell from a truck
owned by the defendant. In light of his incompetence, his mother
brought an action on his behalf against the defendait for personal
injuries. The complaint was never served. Nearly four years after
the action was commenced, the plaintiff filed an amended
complaint and served it on the defendant. The trial court granted
the defendant's motion to dismiss.591 On appeal, the plaintiff
argued that the three-year period in the dismissal statute should
have been tolled as a result of his incompetence. 5" The court of
appeal dismissed that contention, holding that the three-year time
period set forth in section 583.210 cannot be tolled. 93
In Davis v. Allstate Insurance Co., 594 the court reversed a
dismissal under the three-year statute. A flood resulted in an action
by many property owners against their insurance companies. The
plaintiffs eventually filed a third amended complaint. Davis
apparently had not served on Allstate any of the first three
complaints. Shortly before the three-year period would expire,
Davis attempted to serve Allstate with the third amended
complaint. He inadvertently gave Allstate the superseded second
amended complaint. After the three-year period had run, he
corrected his mistake and provided Allstate with the third amended
complaint. The court of appeal decided that Davis timely served the
summons and complaint on Allstate in that he substantially
complied with the statutory requirements for serving summons. 95
The court pointed out that the purpose of the three-year dismissal
statute -- to limit delay -- was not defeated because the third
amended complaint was substantially similar to the second
amended complaint and thus, Allstate had timely notice of Davis'
allegations against it.59
6
591. ld. at 326-27, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
592. Id. at 327, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
593. Id. at 327, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
594. 217 Cal. App. 3d 1229, 266 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1989).
595. Id. at 1233-34, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 670-71.
596. Id. at 1234, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
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CONCLUSION
Between 1988 and 1990, the Sixth District Court of Appeal
issued a myriad of opinions in civil cases that defined significant
substantive rights of parties and procedural duties of the attorneys
who serve them. Following a review and analysis of those opinions,
the court's specific tendencies in reaching its decisions, as well as
the court's general outlook, come into view.
In 1988-1990, the court again exhibited a conservative
philosophy, more conservative than its approach in 1985-1987. For
example, the court showed little tolerance for lawsuits against the
government, ruling in favor of public defendants in the vast
majority of cases. Also, the court generally continued to construe
and apply statutes strictly, even if the result was to deprive a
plaintiff of his or her action. Once again, the court lacked interest
in creating new law.
In tort cases, the court generally ruled against the plaintiffs.
However, public defendants received much better results than
private defendants. The court decided all eight of its government
tort liability cases in favor of the government. Defendants prevailed
in only half of the court's tort cases involving private defendants.
In two of the court's most important tort decisions, the Sixth
District held the defendants responsible for damages. In one case,
the court ruled that an accounting firm was liable to non-clients
who foreseeably were injured by the firm's negligence. In the other
case, the court allowed recovery for "fear of cancer."
The Sixth District revealed a strong tendency to favor insurance
companies. In nine out of eleven cases, the court accepted the
insurer's position of no coverage or minimal coverage. The
supreme court reversed one of the court's rulings in favor of an
insurer and directed the Sixth District to reconsider another one of
those rulings. The court's rationale in other decisions for insurers
was not convincing. Aside from coverage issues, the court's rulings
in bad faith actions against insurers likewise tended to favor
insurers.
As it did in 1985-1987, the Sixth District generally ruled for
employers in employment law cases. Unlike its 1985-1987
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decisions which unanimously benefitted employers, the court
denied all relief in only four out of seven wrongful termination
actions against a private employer in 1988-1990. The government
won both of the two employment cases involving public
defendants. Also, the court showed a tendency to favor
management over unions in a few labor cases.
In environmental cases, the Sixth District may be shifting its
direction or, at least, its focus. Whereas it was partial to plaintiffs
in nearly all of its environmental cases in 1985-1987, the court held
that the public agency complied with CEQA in five out of seven
cases in 1988-1990. Despite the remarkable statistical difference,
the court's opinions reveal no disdain for environmental concerns.
Instead, the court refused to read into CEQA alleged duties which
found no support in the language of the act. Also, the court
rejected demands for comprehensive environmental review of a
project which was at a preliminary stage of development. The Sixth
District recognized that environmental review must be
commensurate only with the development stage of the project.
The Sixth District's landlord-tenant decisions did not evince a
more conservative outlook. Although the court decided all three of
its landlord-tenant cases in favor of the landlord in 1985-1987, the
court ruled for the landlord in two cases, and held for the tenant in
two cases, in 1988-1990. In its key decision in this area, the court
concluded that a recapture provision, which allowed a lessor to
cancel a lease upon the tenant's mere request for consent to a
sublease, was void as against public policy.
The Sixth District faced many important constitutional law
issues. The court revealed a tendency to prefer First Amendment
values in libel cases. The court also protected the right to privacy
in a significant mandatory drug testing case. However, the court
was reluctant to allow the religious expression freedom to insulate
members of religious organizations from liability for harmful
conduct.
Finally, as it did in 1985-1987, the Sixth District continued to
enforce procedural statutes strictly in 1988-1990. In five out of
seven cases, the court applied the dismissal rules in the Code of
Civil Procedure to bar a plaintiff's action.
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Between 1988 and 1990, the court seemed very willing to
address controversial issues in its reported decisions in civil cases.
Now that it has six justices operating at peak efficiency, the court's
decisions in upcoming years will merit and receive considerable
attention from legal scholars and the bar.
1154.
